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COUPLES AND COUPLING IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A
COMMENT ON THE LEGAL HISTORY OF
LITIGATING FOR LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS
Mary Anne Case*

O

F three possible focal points for gay identity-the individual, the
community, and the couple-the couple is the least visible in litigation about the public sphere rights of gay men and lesbians. Using
as my starting point the cases collected in Professor Patricia Cain's
litigation history,' I shall explore in this Commentary the implications of the couple's absence from most public sphere cases and its
uneasy, shadowy presence within others.
It should not be surprising that the couple is both a suppressed and
a contested element in gay rights litigation. Coupling, in two senses of
the word, is both defining and problematic for gay men and lesbians
in this society. That is to say, "coupling" as in "forming a pair bond"
and "coupling" as in "copulating" are exactly what gay men and lesbians may want to do and what troubles society when they try to do
it. Same-sex coupling might therefore be what sodomy is not-"the
behavior that defines the class ' 2 of homosexuals.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful for the
help of Ken Abraham, David Bauer, Mary Bonauto and Jennifer Wriggins, Pat Cain, Mary
Case, Bill Eskridge, David Garrow, Pat Gill, Clay Gillette, Anne Goldstein, Janet Halley,
John Harrison, John Hersey, Nan Hunter, Pam Karlan, Cliff Landesman, Bill La Piana, Sylvia
Law, Debra Livingston, Cheryl and Edward Mendelson, Bill Miller, Dan Ortiz, Rick Pildes,
Todd Preuss, George Rutherglen, Rick Scarola, Buffie Scott, Adina Schwartz, Paul Stephan,
Peter Swire, Jonathan Vogel, Walter Wadlington, Julia Winter, Deborah Weiss, Susan White,
Ted White; Bill Rubenstein of the ACLU, Dickson Osborne of the Campaign for Military
Service, Joe Baker and Martin Manalansan of GMHC, Evan Wolfson of Lambda; participants
in the Virginia Law Review Symposium on Sexual Orientation and the Law, the University of
Michigan Legal Theory Workshop and GALLSA of UVA; and my research assistants Kate
Cooper and Dionne Thompson.
I Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Gay and Lesbian Rights: A Legal History 79 Va. L. Rev.
1551 (1993).
2 See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If the Court [in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)] was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the
behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state
sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious.").
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Many of the traditional dichotomies that plague gay rights litigation meet and break down in the gay couple. 3 The couple is a mediating term between status and conduct, private and public, sameness
and difference, and the sexual and nonsexual aspects of gay identity.
Just as "couple" is both a noun and a verb, in a gay couple conduct
and status slip ineluctably into one another. Coupling behavior can
range from the exchange of bodily fluids to the exchange of vows and
rings. The couple can be simultaneously the situs for the most private
of intimate relationships and the most public representation of it.
And in a gay couple the signs of sameness and difference with respect
to heterosexual pairs are both clearly visible.
In light of all this, it is to be expected that the reaction of the legal
system to the gay couple will be complex, ambivalent, and at times
apparently confused, contradictory, or inconsistent. Nevertheless,
one can draw a few tentative conclusions: First, the couple as pair
bond may be most absent from litigation where it might be most useful-in challenges to the sodomy statutes, challenges which might
benefit if brought on behalf of persons whose relationship the courts
could more readily assimilate to the marital relationship protected in
Griswold.4 At the same time, the pair bond is most often present and
most negatively weighted where it may seem least relevant-in public
employment litigation provoked by an employer's objection to an
employee's acknowledgement that s/he has a "spouse" of the same
sex.

Most significantly, when pair bonding and copulating can be, as it
were, decoupled, courts generally react favorably to the pair bond and
negatively to copulation. Courts accord the most favorable treatment
to those gay men and lesbians involved in close, long-term relationships from which the sexual aspect has perforce been removed due to
the death, illness, or imprisonment of one of the members of the
couple. But when, as is typically the case, the two aspects of same-sex
coupling are inextricably linked, pair bonding generally loses its positive valence and serves to intensify the courts' negative reaction to
same-sex copulation; indeed, there is a tendency to collapse the two
forms of coupling into one another, to see pair bonds as vehicles for
3 As I shall make clear infra, by "couple," I mean simply two gay men or lesbians together
in any intimate or sexual capacity, not just those in a domestic partnership.
4 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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regular sodomitical copulation. The reaction provoked by members
of gay couples who attempt to claim the heterosexual privilege of
marriage is perhaps the harshest. I shall try to suggest several possible explanations for these reactions.
Finally, in response to suggestions by both Professors Pat Cain and
Janet Halley that gay rights advocates should focus more attention in
the future on the specifics of one form of coupling-copulation-I
shall set forth my reasons for doubting the effectiveness of such a
strategy.
I.

WHAT

IS MISSING FROM PROFESSOR CAIN'S HISTORY

In her contribution to the Symposium, Professor Cain has done a
splendid job organizing a great quantity of material in a useful, coherent, and clear fashion. Nevertheless, as a commentator, I am naturally inclined to focus on what has been left out. Cain makes clear at
the beginning of her article how she has organized it-how she views
what is left out and put in. She says, "I have chosen to focus on
litigation that affects public sphere rights as opposed to litigation
about private relationships and family issues, because Hardwick, as a
practical matter, more directly affects public sphere rights such as
employment and citizenship."'
Without endorsing her assumption about the effects of Hardwick, I
would like to suggest two other ways of looking at what is included
and excluded in her litigation history, and then to discuss one of them
at length. First, even within the public sphere, Cain has mostly
focused on cases in which the law has been the oppressive element.
The gay and lesbian litigants featured in Cain's article are fighting
aspects of the legal system that in some way make life difficult for
them, whether sodomy laws that criminalize their sexual activity,
regulations that deny them governmental employment, or statutory
schemes that discriminate against them. Cain spends little time discussing litigation under the various affirmative gay rights ordinances.
These ordinances provide an opportunity to use law in a positive way
to remedy problems not directly of the law's own making.6
S Cain, supra note 1, at 1553.
6 Of course, as gay legal theorists have observed, the oppressive effect of the law goes far
beyond what it may explicitly require or forbid. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Beyond the
Privacy Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1435 (1992) (arguing that the sodomy laws serve as
a de facto authorization of gaybashing).
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Cain's article, therefore, may underestimate the extent to which, as

Professor William Eskridge has argued, "the government is potentially important as a support for bisexuals, gay men, and lesbians
against social oppression."' Eskridge has advocated that such an
affirmative, egalitarian legal strategy "should dominate gay legal
efforts in the 1990s. ''8 He advises those who fight for gay liberation to
follow the lead of feminists and "call[ ] upon the government to fight
social oppression against [gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals] through
antidiscrimination statutes, hate crimes laws, and sex education programs." 9 I am not, however, going to focus on either the history of
such affirmative efforts or their future potential. To do justice to the
subject, one would have to close the circle from oppressive to affirmative law by discussing the recent legal history of legislation such as the
Colorado Constitution's Amendment 2,10 which creates an oppressive
legal obstacle to affirmative legislation. 1 One would then have to
address the next step-the Oregon legislature's attempt to prohibit
local governments from passing similar antihomosexual ordinances. 2
The Oregon measure, in particular, blurs all distinctions between the
7 William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason:
Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 Yale L.J. 333, 384 (1992).
8 Id. at 385.

9 Id. at 384.
10As is now notorious, Amendment 2 provides:

Neither the State of Colorado... nor any of its ...political subdivisions... shall enact
...any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
Colo.Const. art. II, § 30b. Similar legislation has recently been passed by communities within
Oregon and is springing up on legislative agendas throughout the country. Oregon
Lawmakers Ban Local Votes on Gay Bias, N.Y. Times, July 30, at A10. The Colorado
Supreme Court has preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of Amendment 2 on the grounds
that it violates the equal right to political participation of gay men, lesbians, bisexuals and their
supporters. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (en banc).
I One would also have to consider the paradoxical ways in which affirmative and negative
legislation coexist in many jurisdictions, with the state in essence reserving a monopoly on
discrimination. For example, the District of Columbia made illegal both employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual preference, D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2512 (1992 & Supp.
1993), and homosexual sodomy. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3502 (1992) (repealed 1993) (making
sodomy illegal). Massachussetts prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
employment, housing, and the granting of credit but in the very same bill reserved unto itself
the right to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in the placement of children in
foster care. 1989 Mass. Acts 516.
12 See Oregon Lawmakers, supra note 10, at A10.
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affirmative and the negative. Although the legislature's intent seems
to have been far more limited, it may have inadvertently passed a gay
rights bill by providing that" 'no special rights' will
be granted to any
'13
individual or group based on sexual orientation."
Rather than pursuing these matters, I want instead to focus on
another intriguing absence from Cain's history of defensive public
sphere litigation, the absence of the gay couple. The vast majority of

cases cited in Cain's paper are about either the gay community or the
gay individual,14 with hardly any cases focusing on the gay couple.15
Although shadowy couples emerge in the background in many of

these cases, such couples are rarely, if ever, the focal point of the liti-

13Id. Heterosexuals are, of course, a "group" that has traditionally been given "special
rights" based on their sexual orientation. Depriving them of these rights is tantamount to
protecting the rights of non-heterosexuals.
14Let me spell out briefly what I mean by individual and community cases. The bulk of the
cases discussed by Cain pit one sole gay or lesbian individual, whether it be a criminal
defendant, soldier, employee, or immigrant, against the system. These cases are what I would
call the individual cases. The remainder, the community cases, include those concerning
student organizations, gay bars, and gay rights organizations such as Lambda and the
Mattachine Society. In addition, the community is represented in the employment arena by
cases such as High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) and Society for Individual Rights v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 905
(9th Cir. 1975). The community is also represented in the sodomy cases by Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) and
State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (rex. Ct. App. 1992), two cases brought by groups of gays,
not all having sex with one another in a wild orgy, but together as a community challenging
the sodomy laws. Even the name of the Mattachine's magazine, "One," seems to highlight the
gay individual and the community rather than the gay couple. Although it may suggest the
isolation of the gay man in a hostile world, the name is derived from Thomas Carlyle's
assertion that "[a] mystic band of brotherhood makes all men one." John D'Emilio, Making
Trouble 34-35 (1992).
IsOf course, this is partly a function of Cain's exclusion of cases about private relationships
and family issues, cases where gay couples are more in evidence. Even in family law cases,
however, the gay couple is a problematic focal point, as courts have rarely awarded a litigation
victory to a functioning gay couple. For example, in child custody disputes pitting two
members of a gay couple against each other, courts often decline to give any legal significance
to the couple; in those pitting a divorced person now in a homosexual relationship against her
heterosexual former spouse, the courts often do give legal significance to the couple, but a
negative one-they use its existence as a justification for restricting the custody or visitation
rights of its members. See, e.g., Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law 482-509, 554-560 (William
B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (collecting cases).
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17
gation. 16 This absence is perhaps most striking in the sodomy cases,
all of which feature an individual or the community rather than a
couple, even though it takes two, at least, to commit homosexual
18
sodomy.

I think the couple, the missing third term between the individual

and the community, is an extremely suggestive absence from the litigation history. 19 The individual, the couple, and the community are
16 Of the cases Cain cites, only one, Doe v. Sparks, 733 F. Supp. 227 (W.D.Pa. 1990),
mentioned by Cain only in a footnote, directly implicates the couple (although, again, only one
of its members appears in court). Sparks is a successful challenge to prison visitation
regulations that discriminate between same-sex and different-sex couples. See infra text
accompanying notes 73-74 for a further discusssion of this case. There are, additionally, cases
falling within Cain's rubric but not cited by her in which the gay couple is more directly put at
issue. See, e.g., Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 388-89 (D.R.I. 1980) (holding that high
school student has a First Amendment right to attend prom with a date of the same sex).
Finally, although further consideration of the area would be beyond the scope of this paper,
the couple is central to some cases brought under antidiscrimination ordinances. See, e.g., The
Mixed Couple: Deborah L. Johnson and Dr. Zandra Z. Rolan in Eric Marcus, Making
History: The Struggle for Gay and Lesbian Equal Rights 1945-1990, at 439, 444-53 (1992)
(detailing account of lesbian partners who successfully brought a challenge under Los Angeles
city ordinance and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act after restaurant refused to seat them in
booths reserved for "romantic dining" by couples).
17 By "sodomy cases," I mean all cases involving the criminalization of homosexual
activity, whether or not the crime is technically that of sodomy.
18 Although it is difficult to be certain from the brief statement of facts, it appears that
People v. Peoples, one of the companion eases of People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936
(N.Y.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) involved two male defendants convicted of
having oral sodomy with each other. Id. at 938. The Onofre court, which held the New York
sodomy statute unconstitutional, includes the following in its summary of the various cases
consolidated before it on appeal:
Defendants Peoples and Goss were convicted in Buffalo City Court of violating the
consensual sodomy statute after a jury trial at which evidence was adduced that they
had engaged in an act of oral sodomy in an automobile parked on a street in the City of
Buffalo in the early morning hours.
Id. This passage is about all the opinion has to say about the couple.
As far as I can ascertain, the cameo appearance by Peoples and Goss is the only one by a
couple of defendants in the sodomy cases cited by Professor Cain. All the other sodomy cases,
notably including Hardwick, involve only an individual defendant fighting a charge or the gay
community challenging a statute. The absence of couples from sodomy cases is not entirely
mysterious. In some cases, like Onofre itself, the defendant's sex partner was a minor. Id. at
937-38. In many others, the partner or potential partner was a police officer. See, e.g., People
v. Masten, 292 N.W.2d 171, 172 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 322 N.W.2d 547 (Mich. 1982).
In still other cases, notably Hardwick, one member of the sodomitical couple had more reason
than the other to wish to avoid the publicity of a trial, and so sought to resolve the charges by
plea bargain. See infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
19 At the risk of stating the obvious, let me stress that I am by no means criticizing Cain for
excluding the couple or cases featuring it; I am fascinated by its scarcity in the legal history she
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focal points for gay identity. Both queer theory and personal "coming
out" narrative can begin at any one of these three points. For example, beginning with the individual, many gay men and lesbians recall
that as young people they were tormented by feelings they feared were

unique to them. Again and again they start by saying, "I thought I
was the only one in the world," "the only person that felt the way that
I felt, that was attracted to men" (or to women).20 Beginning with the
couple, some lesbians and gay men may say at first they "fell in love
with this particular person who just happens to be" of the same sex.21
Beginning with the community, 22 some lesbian separatists of the
1970s identified themselves as such initially and primarily for political
reasons of community solidarity, rather than out of desire for a generalized or concrete other.23 And some gay men and lesbians say they
first discovered their gay identity in gay culture; before all else, they
24
sought and found "a people," "their people."
quite comprehensively discusses. Moreover, I am not suggesting that the couple's absence
generally is the result of a grand strategic decision, whether by gay rights litigants, their
opponents or the judges deciding their cases; rather, various circumstances in the individual
case account for the extent to which the couple is visible in it.
20 Marcus, supra note 16, at 82, 188. The first quotation is from "outsider" Paul Philips,
the second from drag queen Rey "Sylvia Lee" Rivera, but countless other gay men and
lesbians use almost the same words. See Randy Shilts, Conduct Unbecoming: Gays in the U.S.
Military, Vietnam to the Persian Gulf passim (1993). Although I shall, for the sake of
convenience, use the oral histories in Marcus' Making History, supra note 16, as my chief
source of examples of the part played by the individual, the couple, and the community in the
shaping of the identities of gay men and lesbians, countless other sources, both anecdotal and
theoretical, tell the same story.
21 The phrase comes from Dianne Richardson, Lesbian Identities in The Theory and
Practice of Homosexuality, 111, 120 (John Hart & Diane Richardson eds., 1981). For an
example of this pattern, see Kathleen Boatwright, The Bridge Builder, in Marcus, supra note
16, at 454-63.
22 1 do not mean to suggest that there is a single, univocal "gay community." Rather, there
are, of course, a series of sometimes overlapping, sometimes distant, sometimes counterpoised
gay and lesbian communities or subcultures from the bars and bathhouses (community as a
site for coupling), to gay rights organizations and gay pride marches, to the less tangible
communities of high camp and the "friends of Dorothy."
23 Although I take these terms from Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete
Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory, in Feminism as Critique, 7795 (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987), unlike Benhabib I use them to suggest the
distinction between desire for a certain sort of person and for a particular person.
24 For the notion of looking for one's people, see Barbara Gittings & Kay Lahusen, The
Rabble Rousers, in Marcus, supra note 16, at 104-26. Gittings, who describes herself as
"temperamentally a joiner," id. at 113, says "the first place I found [my people] was in books,"
the second was in gay bars, the third and perhaps most lasting was in organizations such as
One, Inc. and the Daughters of Bilitis. Id. at 105-13.
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From any one of these three starting points, the story can progress
to either of the others.25 For example, some individual gay men and
lesbians say they first broke from their sense of isolation by discovering the gay community, others by entering into a relationship or having a sexual experience with another person.26 Gay and lesbian
theory has stressed the necessity of community in the formation of

gay identity. As Simon Watney put it, there is "an acknowledgement
that gay identity does not follow automatically from homosexual
desire or practice. Something else is needed-the active presence of a
confident, articulate lesbian and gay culture that clothes homosexual
desire in a stable, collective social identity."27 And, at least in today's
climate, when identity is seen primarily as self-identification rather
than as description or imposition by a (potentially hostile) other,28 few
have questioned the importance of the individual.2 9

The couple is in many ways potentially the mediating term between
the community and the individual. For wherever a gay narrative
begins whatever its focus, 30 the couple remains a central and necessary element. At some point, it seems, almost definitionally, coupling
or the desire to couple must figure in same-sex orientation. In the
words of the adage, "It takes two women to make a lesbian." Now,
25 It may be possible to imagine other starting points, but the only other one I can think of
is, unlike those described above, externally driven: the outside world may well tell someone,
usually a "genderbender," that he or she must be gay; effeminate young men and tomboys may
be pushed into gay identity by a world only too ready to typecast.
26 I found it an interesting exercise to try to chart the narratives in Marcus' Making
History, supra note 16, in terms of the individual/couple/community schema. While many,
including the narrators themselves, might disagree with my reading, I did find all three
elements consistently present but great variety as to both the chronological order in which they
appeared in the narrators lives and the relative importance accorded each element.
27 Simon Watney, School's Out, in inside/out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories 387, 392
(Diana Fuss ed., 1991).
28 Hostile "others" can include the church, the psychiatric community, or the mainstream
culture.
29 Would even extreme biological determinism provide a gay identity to someone who
neither acknowledged nor acted on same sex orientation? I doubt it. Yet I suspect the
tendency today is to say that, at minimum, everyone is gay who says so.
30 The story of coming to gay identity, it should be stressed, says nothing about the content
of that identity, beyond its ability to fit in some way under rubrics such as "gay," "lesbian," or
"queer." Regardless of the starting point or the progress of identity formation, it may be
possible to have an affirmative or self-hating gay identity, to see gay men and lesbians as quite
similar to or fundamentally different from non-gays. Cf. Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating
Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 Va. L.
Rev. 1833 (1993) (disaggregating categories used in gay and lesbian theory).
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some might suspect that I'm being too feminine or too straight in
looking for the couple; the conventional wisdom, after all, has lesbians, but not gay men, settling down into couples with a vengeance.31
And one possible implication of gay liberation has been liberation
from the prison of the couple rather than the mere substitution of a
couple that is just shaped a bit differently from the conventional heterosexual pair.32 I think, however, such a suspicion of my focus is
unjustified given that even the most anonymous bathhouse sex usually
seems to consist of a series of couplings, the Marquis de Sade's geometric fantasies to the contrary notwithstanding.3 3 I am by no means

confining my search for couples in gay rights litigation to the oft
sought after, and equally strenuously derided, bland and monogamous "Ozzie and Harriet"-type gay and lesbian couples who are the
poster children for same-sex marriage.34 Rather, by "couple," I mean
two gay men or lesbians together in any intimate capacity, whether it
be for a lifetime of domestic partnership or a "quickie." In the course
of the discussion, however, I shall have occasion to note the distinc31 See Margaret Nichols, Lesbian Sexuality: Issues and Developing Theory, in Lesbian
Psychologies 97-125 (Boston Lesbian Psychologies Collective ed., 1987). But see Larry
Kramer's assertion that although gay men may both deny their desire for a relationship and
rarely find a "sustaining, nurturing and admirable" one, "most people, at some level, wanted
what I was looking for.... I wanted a lover. I wanted to be in love." Larry Kramer, The
Unwanted Messenger, in Marcus, supra note 16, at 422. Kramer has insisted that:
The concept of making a virtue out of sexual freedom, i.e. promiscuity . . . came
about because gay men had nothing to call their own but their sexuality. The
heterosexual majority has for centuries denied us every possible right of human dignity
.... The right to marry. The right to own property jointly without fear that the law
will disinherit the surviving partner ....
Indeed-the right to walk down the street
holding hands, as you do when you are freely in love .... We are denied the right to
love ....
...Had we been allowed to marry, we would not have felt the obligation to be
promiscuous.
Larry Kramer, Whose Constitution is it, Anyway?, in Reports from the Holocaust: The Making of an AIDS Activist 177, 178-79 (1989).
32 See, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation, in Lesbians,
Gay Men and the Law, supra note 15, at 401, 403 (arguing against the "elevation of married
relationships and of 'couples' in general" over "other relationships of choice").
33 See, e.g., Donatien-Alphonse-Franqois, Marquis de Sade, Juliette 573-74 (Austyn
Wainhouse trans., 1968) (recounting orgy of a hundred nuns linked by dildoes into the shape
of a rosary) and commentary thereon by Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae 240-42 (1991).
34 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same Sex Marriage, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1419, 1486
(1993); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage.", 79 Va. L.
Rev. 1535, 1546 (1993).
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tions courts appear to make in the treatment they give to several different kinds of coupling: pair bonding and its subcategory of
marriage, copulating, and the sort of displays of affection that can be
the prelude to or the public expression of either.
I shall examine statutes and case law from a variety of jurisdictions
and time periods, whose attitudes toward same-sex coupling in all its
forms obviously vary. I have nevertheless chosen to discuss cases thematically rather than chronologically or geographically. In part this
is because Professor Cain's article already provides a fine sense of the
chronological development of the cases here discussed and because
the sample of cases from most jurisdictions is not large enough to
form reliable conclusions. More importantly, I find the sense of continuing ambivalence in the legal system's treatment of gay couples
stronger than that of development over time. Where I see significant
change over time, I shall note it. I must also note, unfortunately, that
even the most regressive views are not entirely outdated.35
II.

DECOUPLED SODOMY

What does the absence of the couple mean in the sodomy cases? In
Bowers v. Hardwick,36 only one line in the entire majority opinion
gives any indication that Hardwick was doing something other than
masturbating alone in his bedroom. It says simply that "Hardwick
(hereafter respondent) was charged with violating the Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with another adult
male in the bedroom of respondent's home."' 37 That's it-just "committing that act with another adult male." This makes Hardwick's
partner seem like a disembodied penis poking through the wall in a
bathroom stall. And that makes it very easy for the majority to say,
"No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated...
by respondent. ' 38
35 As Cain's chronological account makes clear, the history of gay rights litigation has not
been one of steady progress, more of one step forward, two steps back. The very recent past

provides no happier trend. Indeed, the most recent case cited herein, a September 1993
Virginia decision depriving a lesbian mother of custody, see infra note 179, is perhaps the most
hostile to gay rights.
36 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
37 Id. at 187-88 (footnote omitted).
38 Id. at 191.
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There are understandable reasons for the absence of Hardwick's
partner from the litigation-he was a schoolteacher from North Carolina, a married man, and a one-night stand. "Please don't tell my wife
•

.

I'll lose my teaching job," he begged the officer who arrested

them. It was not surprising that he "pleaded to lesser charges and
split," leaving Hardwick alone to fight the case.3 9 Hardwick, single
and a bartender in a gay bar, had less to lose, but this absence of a
pair bond to go along with the copulating is what makes Hardwick,
otherwise so ideal, 40 an imperfect vehicle.41
Griswold,42 Eisenstadt,43 and Hardwick may be seen as a progression of ever more problematic requests for the same legal right to
couple, a point Nan Hunter emphasizes in her analysis of the underlying purpose of the sodomy laws. 44 Locating a historical justification
for the prohibition of sodomy in the biblical injunction against the
"spilling of seed," Hunter notes that "[tjhis same aim of the lawdiscouragement of nonprocreative sex-underlay the statutes prohibiting the use of birth control devices which were stricken as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the 1960's."'4 1 Far from there being,
as the court claimed in Hardwick, no connection between procreation
and homosexual activity, "[iln fact, the exact opposite was the case.
Michael Hardwick, as a person engaged in sodomy, had the same
relationship to procreation as persons using birth control during het39 Art Harris, The Unintended Battle of Michael Hardwick, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1986, at
Cl, C4.
40 In that it involved the actual arrest of someone for consensual oral sex in the privacy of
his own bedroom, Hardwick was a dream come true for gay rights litigators usually plagued by
less sympathetic facts or standing problems.
41 There was, of course, another couple involved in the Hardwick litigation, a married
heterosexual one, that was also virtually erased from the case. Relegated to a footnote in
Justice Byron R. White's opinion, John and Mary Doe joined Hardwick's challenge to the
Georgia sodomy law, which on its face applied equally to heterosexual and homosexual
sodomy. Though the Does claimed that they "were chilled and deterred" from fulfilling their
desire to engage in proscribed sodomy in their home, they were dismissed for lack of standing
because the district court found that, unlike Hardwick, who had been arrested and remained
subject to prosecution, the Does were in no "immediate danger of sustaining any direct injury
from the enforcement of the statute." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2.
42 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down as a violation of the right to
privacy a Connecticut statute that made it a criminal offense to provide contraceptives to
married couples).
43 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down a Massachusetts law that made it
a crime to provide contraceptives to unmarried people).
44 Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 530 (1992).
45 Id at 536.
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erosexual intercourse: none, which was precisely the point. The issue
in Hardwick should have been controlled by Griswold and
' 46
Eisenstadt.
Yet, if one were to chart a progression from Griswold through
Eisenstadt, with the first step being the married couple, followed by
the unmarried heterosexual individual, what is the next logical term
in this series? 47 For some, it might be the gay individual. This would
not only fit well with the facts of Hardwick, but would also deploy
Stanley v. Georgia48 to some strategic advantage. Perhaps with the
benefit of hindsight, however, we may now claim that the next term in
the series is the gay couple. The right of privacy articulated by the
majority in Griswold was, after all, first and foremost a relational
right, not one centered in the autonomy of the individual. 49 For the
Griswold majority, that "case... concerns a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy .... And it concerns a law which... ha[s] a
maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. ' 0
For gay men and lesbians to have their right of "intimate association" recognized, it may be necessary to go back to Griswold, i.e., to a
strong pair bond.5 1 However leery courts may be of a homosexual
46 Id. The law actually struck down in Eisenstadt provides support for Hunter's argument
in that it prohibited alike the distribution of any "article intended to be used for self-abuse,...
the prevention of conception or for causing unlawful abortion." Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 441
n.2 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.272, § 21). The Massachusetts legislature here
demonstrated that it viewed masturbation, contraception, and abortion as equivalent evils.
47 As my colleague Pam Karlan helped me see, the series may begin even earlier, not with

Griswold and the couple, but with the community and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), protecting the liberty interest in
educating children in, respectively, foreign languages and private schools.
48 394 U.S. 557 (1957) (protecting an individual's right to use obscene material in the
privacy of his home).
49 The distinction between relational approaches and those stressing autonomy is common
among feminist legal theorists, building on the work of Carol Gilligan. For a discussion of the
relational and autonomy strands in the rhetoric of Supreme Court abortion decisions, see

Pamela Karlan & Daniel Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights,
and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 858, 876-85 (1993).
50 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added).

51 Acknowledging that syllabi form no part of an opinion, I nevertheless find it curious that
the syllabus of the successful Griswold action prominently mentions "married persons" and
"marital privacy" although the only plaintiffs were a physician and the director of Planned

Parenthood. By contrast, the syllabus to Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), Griswold's
unsuccessful predecessor, speaks only of the "two plaintiffs who were married women,"
erasing the couple although Mr. Poe was in fact a co-plaintiff with his wife. Is this some
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pair bond, they have seen their enterprise with respect to heterosexu52
als in earlier cases as promoting pair bonding, not mere copulation.
The distinction between the coupling the Court may protect and
that which it has said it will not may be captured in the perhaps
overfine distinction between "intimate sexual relationships" and "sexually intimate... relationships." The latter phrase occurs in Judge
Kenneth Starr's response to his colleagues' criticism of Judge Robert
Bork's sweeping refusal to extend privacy rights so as to protect a gay
serviceman from discharge on the grounds of homosexuality.
According to Judge Starr, writing two years before Hardwick:
It simply cannot seriously be maintained under existing case law that
the right of privacy extends beyond.., traditional relationships-the
relationship of husband and wife, or parents to children, or other
close relationships.. . - or that the analytical doctrines enunciated

by the Court lead to the conclusion that government may not regulate
sexually intimate consensual relationships.53
The phrase "intimate sexual relationships" comes from Justice Harry
A. Blackmun's Hardwick dissent. According to Justice Blackmun:
"Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual
intimacy is a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to
family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality."... The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others
suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many
"right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the
richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual
54
has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.
evidence that the ability to focus on the couple helped make some of the difference in the
outcome of the two cases?
52 But see Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 349 (1992):
Consensual sex in whatever form is... a method of cementing a relationship.... But
the Supreme Court has made clear that it shares the dominant American preference for
heterosexual relationships.... The Court does not want to facilitate the cementing of
homosexual relationships, so it cannot be expected to view with sympathy the claim
that anal intercourse is more important to homosexual relationships than to
heterosexual ones because male homosexuals cannot have vaginal intercourse with each
other.
53 Dronenberg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1584 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
54 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)). As this excerpt makes clear, Justice Blackmun's opinion
maintains throughout a delicate balance of emphasis between the protection of individuals and
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I may be reading far too much into the mere difference in word
order between Justice Blackmun and Judge Starr, but I believe Justice
Blackmun is seeking to distinguish intimate sexual relationships from
those which, although every bit as sexual, are less intimate, i.e.,
between pair bonding and copulating. Although the court should perhaps protect both, the former are more easily analogized to the "other
close relationships" that even Judge Starr admits may be encompassed within a right to privacy."
Although the absence of the couple may be a problem in gay rights
litigation, I am not suggesting that its presence would be a solution.
As I thought about the problem the gay couple poses for gay rights
litigation I had in the back of my mind an analogy from that most
resolutely heterosexual of Broadway musicals, "Fiddler on the
Roof."' 56 The plot of "Fiddler" centers on Tevye, the patriarch of a
Jewish family in the shtetl faced with three increasingly less suitable
suitors for the hands of three of his daughters. The first suitor is just
poor and young, but a member of the community in all senses of the
word; the second suitor is a Jewish revolutionary; the third is a Gentile. The father has problems with each of these suitors, problems
which he weighs in an interior monologue of competing considerations. On the one hand is always "Tradition," warning him against
any departure from the way things have always been done. On the
other is his daughter. For each of the first two suitors, the father
overcomes his reservations and blesses his daughter's marriage when
she appears before him arm in arm with her intended, asking for his
approval. The scales tip and the voice of tradition falls silent when
the father is able to say, "But look at my daughter's eyes. She loves

that of relationships. Consider, for example, the A:B:B:A structure ("individuals . . .
relationships ....
relationship... individual") of the final quoted sentence. His highlighting of
the individual elsewhere in the opinion conforms both to the facts of Hardwick and to the
Eisenstadt holding that "the marital couple is not an independent entity.., but an association

of two individuals .... If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual
. " Eisenstadt,
.... 405 U.S. at 453. According to Justice Blackmun: "We protect the decision
whether to have a child because parenthood alters so dramatically an individual's selfdefinition ....[WMe protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of
individuals." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 67-72, 86-93 for a comparable discussion of Braschi v.
Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
56 Joseph Stein, Fiddler on the Roof (1964) [hereinafter Fiddler].
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him."' 57 And that causes the father to bless the union. The third
daughter comes alone before her father and fails to get his blessing. 8
There is an interesting chicken and egg problem with the third
daughter's coming alone: Does she come alone because she has to, or,
if she came with someone, could she have been recognized? 59 I think
that gay men and lesbians are in the position of the third daughter,
that is to say, they will not be recognized until they stand together
with the ones they love, and they cannot stand together until they are
recognized.
To push the analogy to "Fiddler" even further, let me argue that
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Hardwick may be seen as the three daughters. Like the request of the poor, young tailor of the community for
permission to marry the eldest daughter, Griswold accepts most of the
traditional social framework. Far from calling into question the institution of marriage, the result in Griswold is seen to strengthen and
confirm it. But, as Tevye muses when finally giving his permission to
his eldest and her intended, despite their failure to go through a
57 Id. at 86.
58 The third daughter, Chava: "The world is changing, Papa."

The Father, Tevye: "No. Some things do not change for us. Some things will never
change."
Chava: "We don't feel that way.., we want to be married."
Tevye: "Are you out of your mind? Don't you know what this means, marrying outside of
the faith?"
Chava: "But Papa ...
Tevye: "I said no! Never talk about this again! Never mention his name again! Never see
him again! Never! Do you understand me?"
Chava: "Yes, Papa, I understand you." Despite her father's objections, Chava marries, a
fact which her mother, Golda, is the first to communicate to her father. Teyve tells Golda
their daughter is now dead to them and reminisces about the sweet, happy child she once was.
Chava then approaches again to ask for her father's approval. Again, she is alone:
Chava: "Papa, I beg you to accept us."
Tevye: "Accept them? How can I accept them. Can I deny everything I believe in? On the
other hand, can I deny my own child? On the other hand, how can I turn my back on my
faith, my people? If I try to bend that far, I will break. On the other hand.., there is no other
hand. No, no, no!"
Chava: "Papa. Papa."
Villagers behind transparent curtain: "Tradition."
Fiddler, supra note 56, at 100-03.
59 Chava's intended, the Christian Fyedka, had lobbied her vigorously for a chance to talk
to her father about their plans, but she stopped him, saying, "that would be the worst thing,
I'm sure of it." Id. at 98.
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matchmaker, as is traditional, "One little time you pull out a prop,
and where does it stop. Where does it stop?"'
For traditionalists on the Court and in Tevye's village, it does not
stop soon enough. Tevye's second daughter, Hodel, and her intended,
Perchik, resemble the image of an unmarried heterosexual couple that
I suspect was current in the early 1970s, at the time of the Eisenstadt
decision. Both individualists and full of new ideas, Hodel and Perchik
are eager to put them into practice together in old settings. They
stretch the bounds of tradition, but not quite to the breaking point.
Because they begin within the community and hope to change it
rather than reject it, they have some hope of acceptance within it.
But the majority on the Court sees Hardwick's claim, just as Tevye
sees that of his third daughter, as falling wholly outside both the tradition and the community. Because the couple is the visible sign of
this affront to tradition, its members provoke the strongest hostility
when they appear together. If they insist on remaining together, they
must be entirely banned from acceptance by the community.
III.

THE DOUBLE BIND OF THE COUPLE

The presence of the couple is at least as great a problem for gay and
lesbian litigants as is its absence. Like the patrons at gay bars, gay
people seeking government employment often seem worse off when
they are visibly coupled, even, indeed especially, when they form
long-term, close, and openly acknowledged pair bonds.6

Why are visible gay couples so problematic for the legal system?
One likely reason may be because such coupling is seen as indicative
of a homosexual orientation both more firmly established and more
public than either an occasional furtive, anonymous encounter or an
admission of orientation unaccompanied by demonstrable homosexual acts. Not only is there less doubt as to orientation, less chance
that this is just a passing phase, the coupling usually is described as
undesirable "flaunting." As Richard Mohr puts it, "acting as a
couple tends, as much as anything short of saying one is gay, to proFiddler, supra note 56, at 50.
This may at first seem somewhat counterintuitive. One might expect even opponents of
gay sexuality to prefer it to be domesticated. After all, someone peacefully at home with a
partner is less likely to be out preying upon other's children or spouses or being preyed upon
by foreign agents.
60
61
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ject one's affectional preferences into the public realm."'6 2 This is
clearly one of the reasons why the Army, much more concerned with
public declarations than with anything else, penalizes gay marriage
even in the absence of other homosexual activity or declarations.63
An attempt to marry may be the most threatening form of gay coupling because it is viewed as an attempt to invade and/or to parody the
very bastions of heterosexual privilege. 64 Marriage is a demand on
the part of a gay couple that the society do even more than tolerate
them, that it affirmatively give recognition to their coupled status.
Moreover, anti-gay persons in authority seem ready to conflate one
kind of coupling with another, to make the leap of imagination from
pair bonding to sodomitical copulation. Thus, for Attorney General
Bowers, the marriage ceremony Robin Shahar underwent with
another woman seems to have been tantamount to committing an act
of sodomy in public: although there was no evidence that Shahar had
violated Georgia law, Bowers withdrew her offer of employment as an
attorney in the Criminal Division "to ensure public perception (and
the reality) that his [d]epartment is enforcing and will continue to
enforce the laws of the State."' 65 Bowers testified in a deposition that
"the natural consequence of a marriage is some sort of sexual conduct, I would think to most people, and if it's homosexual it would
'66
have to be sodomy."
Hence, the couple may present a double bind for gay and lesbian
litigants because it focuses courts on what couples do, that is to say,
have sex. In this connection, it is most interesting that two of the
most prominent victories in gay rights litigation, Braschi6 7 and
62 Richard Mohr, Gays/Justice: A Study of Ethics, Society, and Law 236 (1988).

63 See infra text accompanying notes 75-80.
64 See infra text accompanying notes 84-88, 113-33.
65 Shahar v. Bowers, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668, 671 (N.D. Ga. March 9, 1992);

cf. National Gay Task Force v.Board of Educ. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d. 1270, 1273, (10th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) ("Surely a school may fire a teacher for engaging in an
indiscreet public act of oral or anal intercourse.").
66 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 32, Shahar v.
Bowers, No. 1:91-CV-2397-RCF (N.D. Ga. filed Oct. 5, 1991) (quoting Bowers Deposition at
80-81). See infra text accompanying notes 115-18 for further discussion.
67 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that, where rent
control laws prevent dispossession by a landlord of family members of a deceased tenant who
lived in a controlled apartment with the tenant, "a family includes two adult lifetime partners
whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment
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Kowalski 6s are cases in which the court can bless a couple without bless-

ing their sexual activities. 69 In neither case is the couple functioning as a couple-Braschi's lover is dead, Kowalski has emerged
from a coma severely impaired 7°-so the court can focus on all the
wonderful pair bonding 71 without being threatened by the sexual implications of that pair bonding.72 The same is also true of Doe v.
and interdependence" so that Braschi was entitled to succession rights in the apartment he had
shared with his lover for ten years before the latter's death).
68 In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). After Sharon
Kowalski was severely injured in an auto accident in 1983, Karen Thompson, the lover with
whom she had been "living together as a couple for four years," id. at 791, waged a protracted
court battle for guardianship against Kowalski's parents, who were unaware of their
daughter's lesbian relationship before the accident and sought to bar Thompson from contact
with their daughter. The parents won the first several rounds of litigation, in opinions that
described the two women as "roommates" and their relationship as "uncertain." In Re
Guardianship of Kowaiski, 382 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In the final decision,
the court awarded guardianship of Kowalski to Thompson, whom it described as "her lesbian
partner," 478 N.W.2d at 791, finding such guardianship consistent with Kowalski's wishes and
in her best interests. The decision paved the way for Thompson to bring Kowalski home from
the hospital into a "fully handicap-accessible [sic] home [she had built] in the hope that Sharon
will be able to live there." Id. at 794. See also Karen Thompson & Julie Andrzejewski, Why
Can't Sharon Kowalski Come Home? (1988) (telling Thompson's side of the story).
69 Neither of these cases is cited by Cain because neither falls within her rubric-both
concern private relationships and family issues rather than the public sphere.
70 Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 791. Nevertheless, Kowalski's father raised the specter of
copulation, claiming "he and his wife are worried that Thompson will sexually abuse their
daughter if Thompson is allowed to continue visiting her." Thompson & Andrzejewski, supra
note 68, at 81; see also id. at 176-77 (discussing how parent's family doctor opined that a risk
of sexual abuse existed). And Thompson herself makes clear that her relationship with
Kowalski continued to be physically intimate after the accident. Id. at 31, 51. But the only
sexual relationships apparently considered by the court that ruled in Thompson's favor are
those Thompson had with other people since Kowalski's accident, which it found raised "no
reason to question Thompson's commitment to Sharon's best interests." Kowalski, 478
N.W.2d at 795-96.
71See, e.g., Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 794 (describing the couple as a "family of affinity");
Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 51 (describing the "long-term interdependent nature of the 10-year
relationship").
72 After I first delivered this paper, I ran across a similar argument in Richard D. Mohr,
Gay Ideas: Outing and Other Controversies 82 (1992). Discussing Braschi in the context of
another, later New York Court of Appeals case, Alison D. v. Virginia M., 569 N.Y.S.2d 586
(N.Y. 1991), in which the court resolved a child custody dispute between lesbian former
partners by denying all rights to the one partner they identify as "a biological stranger to the
child," id. at 587, and hence a "nonparent," id. at 588, Mohr observes:
Conveniently for the equanimity of the New York court's mind in the gay rental case,
the plaintiff was not, after all, in a living gay relation-owing to the death of his lifepartner.... The courts may give rights to gays by ones, but they will not give rights to
gays by twos. They will not give rights to gays in relations,which is after all what it is to
be gay-to have relations of a certain sort. So when the courts do on occasion give
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Sparks,7 3 one of the few couple-centered cases cited by Professor
Cain. Sparks authorizes noncontact visits by the boyfriends or girlfriends of gay and lesbian prisoners, once again blessing the pair bond
without needing to confront the copulation.74
The sense that pair bonding and copulating may each be a sufficient marker for the evil that is homosexuality, even when separated
from one another, is clearest in the military's approach to homosexuality. Military regulations list three bases for separation from the service on grounds of homosexuality: copulating, 75 "acknowledgement of
homosexual status, 7 6 and pair bonding.77 The military considers
rights to gays-by ones-they do so in spite of rather than because of their gayness.
And in giving rights to gays by ones only, the courts, even as they hand out a right,
destroy the very basis and idea of gayness, that it is a relation between people.
Mohr, supra.
73 733 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Pa. 1990).
74 For further evidence of this phenomenon, see Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine,
Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 Temple L. Rev. 511,
519 n.61 (1990) (collecting cases in which judges in "conservative jurisdictions," faced with
"nonexistent or imperfect testamentary documents" made by deceased gay men, "noted the
homosexual nature of the relationship between the men and decided in favor of the surviving
lover"). The ability of the judging observer to separate the pair bond from any sexual taint
similarly explains 19th- and early 20th-century society's acceptance of female couples such as
those in so-called "Boston marriages" (same-sex households of two college alumnae linked,
inter alia, by close, loving friendship). Although debate rages today about the sexual
component of such relationships, contemporary observers clearly saw them as unthreateningly
non-sexual. See Lillian Faderman, Odd Girls and Twilight Lovers: A History of Lesbian Life
in Twentieth-Century America 15, 18, 21 (1991).
75 It is a ground for separation if "the soldier has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act." Army Reg. 635-200, ch. 15-3(a) (1990). A
"homosexual act" is defined as "any bodily contact ... between soldiers of the same sex for
sexual satisfaction." Army Reg. 635-200, ch. 15-2(c). See infra text accompanying notes 21416.
76 It is a ground for separation if "[t]he soldier has stated that he or she is a homosexual or
bisexual." Army Reg. 635-200, ch. 15-3(b).
77 It is a ground for separation if "[t]he soldier has married or attempted to marry a person
known to be of the same biological sex (as evidenced by the external anatomy of the persons
involved)." Army Reg. 635-200, ch. 15-3(c). Although the Clinton Administration's
proposed revision of the military policy governing homosexuality in the armed forces has aptly
been nicknamed "Don't ask, don't tell, don't understand," it appears to work no substantial
change in this framework. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's July 19, 1993, Memorandum to
the Joint Chiefs provides that "[s]ervicemembers will be separated for homosexual
conduct.... Homosexual conduct is a homosexual act, a statement by the servicemember that
demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, or a homosexual marriage
or attempted marriage." Memorandum from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces, July 19, 1993, at 1-2.
Aspin retains the prior definition of "homosexual act." Id. at 2. The Policy Guidelines further
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each basis adequate standing alone, but allows soldiers guilty of either
form of same-sex coupling to remain in the service if there is evidence
breaking the chain of inference from coupling to homosexual status.7
From the military perspective, the problem seems therefore not that
homosexuality leads to coupling, but that coupling is evidence of
homosexuality. 79 The Army, for example, attempted to dismiss
Dusty Pruitt from its reserves for homosexuality after a published
interview revealed she "had twice gone through ceremonies of marriage to other women."8 0
The Freudian notion of the "narcissm of minor differences" may
help to explain why both gay sex and gay marriage provoke such hostile reactions."1 Freud describes this phenomenon as occurring on
both the individual and group levels. In the individual, "this self-love
behaves as though the occurrence of any divergence from [one's] own
particular lines of development involved a criticism of them and a
provide that "[b]odily contact between servicemembers of the same sex that a reasonable
person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
(eg., handholding or kissing in most circumstances) will be sufficient to initiate separation"
although "association with known homosexuals, presence at a gay bar, possessing or reading
homosexual publications, or marching in a gay rights rally in civilian clothes will not, in and of
themselves, constitute ... a basis for initiating an investigation." Department of Defense,
Policy Guidelines on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces 1-2 (1993). Nor will the
mere listing "of someone of the same gender ... as an insurance beneficiary or in a similar
context" provide a basis for investigation. Id. at 2.
78 Thus, with respect to a soldier involved in a same-sex marriage, there may be "further
findings that the member is not a homosexual or bisexual." Army Reg. 635-200, ch. 15-3(c).
And there is no ban on the retention of "[p]ersons who have been involved in homosexual acts
in an apparently isolated episode... and in the absence of other evidence that the person is a
homosexual."
79 As Judge Norris put it in the Watkins case:
If a straight soldier and a gay soldier of the same sex engage in homosexual acts because
they are drunk, immature or curious, the straight soldier may remain in the Army while
the gay soldier is automatically terminated. In short, the regulations do not penalize
soldiers for engaging in homosexual acts; they penalize soldiers who have engaged in
homosexual acts only when the Army decides that those soldiers are actually gay.
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
80 Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992).
Although the Ninth Circuit found that "there is no evidence in this case that she engaged in
homosexual acts," id. at 1162, it nevertheless permitted Pruitt, an acknowledged lesbian, to
pursue an equal protection challenge to the Army regulations concerning separation for
homosexual status.
81 See, e.g., infra note 188 (noting that behavior seen as "parodie" of heterosexuality is
perhaps therefore harshly condemned).
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demand for their alteration. 8' 2 At the group level, he notes "the
advantage which a comparatively small cultural group offers of
allowing.., a convenient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the
inclination to aggression, by means of which cohesion between members of the community is made easier."8'

3

Both gay sex and gay mar-

riage most sharply throw into relief the similarities and differences
between couples of the same and of different sexes; they force heterosexuals to give some consideration to their own way of doing things.
Sylvia Law has suggested that a gay or lesbian pair bond is perceived as more threatening to society than mere same-sex copulation
because the former more sharply calls into question traditional gender
roles and gender hierarchy. 4 According to Law:
Gay people and feminists violate conservative ideology of family in
many ways.... [When homosexual people build relationships of caring and commitment, they deny the traditional belief and prescription
that stable relationships require the hierarchy and reciprocity of
male/female polarity. In homosexual relationships authority cannot
be premised on the traditional criteria of gender. For this reason lesbian and gay couples who create stable loving relationships are far
more threatening to conservative values than individuals who simply
violate the ban against non-marital or non-procreative sex.8 5

82 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology in The Works of Sigmund Freud (standard ed. 1921),
at 7, 101. Freud acknowledges an inability to determine why "just these details of
differentiation" are so disturbing. Id. I am grateful to Adina Schwartz for drawing this
concept to my attention.
83 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents 61 (James Strachey trans., Norton 1961)
(1930). Freud uses this concept chiefly to account for the antipathy felt by closely related
peoples such as the English and the Scotch and to account for the role played by groups such
as the Jews of medieval Europe. Cf. Cheshire Calhoun, Denaturalizing and Desexualizing
Lesbian and Gay Identity, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1859, 1868-70 (1993) (arguing that the status of
sexual outlaw plays an important role in gay identity formation as well).
84 Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 187,
196, 218-21, 232.
85 Id. at 218. The Final Report of the Task Force on Family Diversity for the City of Los
Angeles put a similar point somewhat more tendentiously: "The perceived danger posed by
homosexual relationships is that they present an opposing and threatening metaphor of
equality, mutuality and respect that, if adopted as a model for heterosexual relationships,
would seriously endanger male prerogatives of freedom, excess and authority which men have
been taught to expect and hold dear." Id. at Supp. Part I, S-206-07 (quoted in David Link,
The Tie that Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the Family Commitments of Same-Sex Couples,
23 Loy. of L.A. L. Rev. 1055, 1141 (1990)).
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How does Law's thesis accord with a case like Braschi? Somewhat
paradoxically, the result in that case may support rather than undermine her theory. Although Brasohi did give legal status to a "stable,
loving" gay couple, it did so precisely because the behavior of the
couple, rather than radically calling into question the "'nuclear'/
'normal'/'genuine' family," 6 closely resembled it, without squarely
challenging its preeminence. Using categories common in gay theory,
one might argue that the Braschi couple is an example of "passing,"
not "drag,""7 let alone some non-parodic alternative. The Braschi
couple can therefore be more reassuring than destabilizing to a conservative model of pair bonding."" This may be one reason why, if
Law is correct about the nature of the threat posed by same-sex
couples, the court may have felt less threatened by this couple-they
were blending in, behaving "just like everybody else." Nevertheless,
unlike a gay couple who seeks to marry, they were more modest in
their claim to be treated like everyone else.89
While this may help explain the New York Court of Appeals' willingness to recognize the couple, it should cast a shadow over the
unbounded enthusiasm with which gay and lesbian advocates greeted
the decision. 90 In Braschi, the court held, in effect, that if you behave
86 Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 56 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
87 "Passing" and "drag" are both varieties of cross-dressing; the distinction between them is
broadly analogous to that between a copy and a parody. A "passing" woman dons male attire
for the purpose, inter alia, of being taken for a man by observers; she may live her life as a
man. A "drag queen" will rarely be mistaken for a woman nor does he generally seek to be.
Although men can pass and women be in drag (e.g., Marlene Dietrich), history seems to have
given us far more passing women, in part because they could use male attire as an entree to
male privileges. See Maijorie Garber, Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing & Cultural Anxiety
151, 152, 234 (1992) (discussing "drag" and "passing"). As many writers of gay and lesbian
theory have pointed out, drag, in particular, can serve as a destabilizing commentary on
heterosexual gender norms. See Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in The
Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader 307 (Henry Abelove et al. eds. 1993). "Passing" walks an
even finer line, at times reaffirming the value of traditional roles even while undermining their
essentialism.
88 They are reassuring to the extent the couple is perceived to be saying to the traditional
family, in effect, "we want to be just like you," destabilizing to the extent they necessarily add,
"and we don't need the male/female polarity to accomplish this." Of course, the fact that this
otherwise traditional couple was composed of two men retains in and of itself some of the
dangers and the possibilities perceived by Law.
89 If Braschi-like domestic partnership is perceived as "passing," gay marriage is "drag,"
threatening in part because perceived as parodic.
90 I can readily understand that, for advocates of gay and lesbian rights, half a loaf is better
than none. In the absence of same-sex marriage or even of meaningful domestic partnership
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like Ozzie and Harriet, or alternatively like Baron and Feme, 9 ' then
you are a couple and can receive the succession rights of family members under the New York rent control laws. The Court of Appeals, in
determining whether the household Braschi had shared with his
deceased lover, Blanchard, had "all of the normal familial characteristics,"92 focused on things like sexual fidelity, sharing a domicile, and
commingling finances as the evidence of commitment it required
before recognizing the couple.
Married couples in this society are not required to do the rather
conservative things the Court of Appeals required of Braschi and his
lover. 9a A marriage certificate now allows heterosexual couples to
have an open marriage, 94 to live in different cities or in different apartments in the same city, to structure their finances as they please, without having their commitment or the legal benefits that follow from it
challenged. I agree with Nancy Polikoff that, from a feminist perspective, the history of marriage, whether of the same or different sexes, is
unhelpful precedent.95 But, assuming that marriage is a social construction, we need to look at how it is being constructed in our present society. I would argue that in our society marriage can be
legislation, gay couples understandably might rejoice at whatever legal recognition they can
get.
91See I William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 429-33 (photo. reprint
1979) (1765).
92 Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 54.

93I by no means intend to suggest that fidelity or the sharing of space and material goods
are per se outmoded, sexist, or oppressive. Of course committed couples may find themselves
eager to share everything in an egalitarian, loving way rather than one rife with slavish
conformity to gender role stereotypes. But I think it is important to remember the particular
ways the Braschi court's criteria played out in traditional legal and cultural definitions of the

couple. Sexual fidelity was expected of a married woman in essence to protect her husband's
property interest in her and in the children she would bear him; her infidelity typically received
far harsher penalties under the law than his. The requirement of shared domicile meant
simply that "when a woman marries, her husband's domicile automatically supersedes her
own." See Herma Hill Kay, Text, Cases and Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination 203 (3d
ed. 1988); id. at 203-08 and sources therein cited. Finally, finances were commingled under
the husband's sole control and often in his name; until passage of Married Women's Property
Acts, he alone could dispose of the couple's assets. Braschi's success may be attributable in
part to the court's ability to assimilate him conceptually into the traditional class of widows.
Like those proverbial favorites of the court, he has forsaken his own home for that of his
spouse, on whom he depends financially, whom he cares for in his final illness, and whom he
survives. His claim to the apartment resembles a claim for dower rights.
94 At least in those jurisdictions that do not prosecute adultery.
95 See Polikoff, supra note 34, at 1538-41.
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liberating rather more than it need be oppressive from the perspective
of gender. Although some alternatives to same-sex marriage, such as
domestic partnership laws, may also have a liberating potential, all
are not equally promising. I find it puzzling that any proponent of
gay or lesbian rights who affirmatively opposes same-sex marriage9 6
could enthusiastically support Braschi. It seems to me that to the
extent a case like Braschi can be read to discourage experimentation
with all less traditional ways for couples to organize their lives and
manifest their commitment to one another, it may be more oppressive
for feminists, whatever their sexual preference, than gay marriage
would be for anyone.

IV. THE PROS AND CONS OF COUPLING
Whether a gay litigant is seen as part of a couple may spell the
difference between victory and defeat for him or her. Unfortunately,
sometimes being coupled seems to spell victory, at other times defeat.
It is almost always a double-edged sword. Some examples may prove
the point. In each of the following two cases the gay plaintiff ultimately prevails. In each there is also a difference of perspective
among judges both as to whether the gay litigant is part of a couple
and as to whether he should prevail. Interestingly, in the first case the
majority stresses the absence of a couple in ruling for the plaintiff; in
the second, by contrast, the appellate court stresses the presence of a
couple in overturning an unfavorable lower court ruling.
In Morrison v. State Boardof Education,97 the petitioner, a teacher,
was at risk of losing his license because, during a week in which a
fellow teacher and friend, one Schneringer, was experiencing severe
marital stress, the "two men engaged in a limited, non-criminal 98
physical relationship which petitioner described as being of a homosexual nature." 99 The dissent, which wished to uphold the school
board's decision to bar Morrison from teaching, repeatedly refers to
the occurence as "a homosexual relationship. ' ' °" Judge Mathew 0.
96

That is to say one who views it not merely as unattainable, but as undesirable.

97 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969).
98 As the majority is careful to explain "neither sodomy, oral copulation [nor public sex]
were [sic] involved." Id. at 377 n.4 (citations omitted).
99 Id. at 377-78 (citations omitted).
100 See, e.g., id. at 395 (containing three separate such references); id. at 396 (containing two
references); id. at 401.
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Tobriner, writing for the majority, just as insistently refers to it as
"the Schneringer incident"'0 1 and stresses that it is "a single, isolated,
and limited homosexual contact."' 10 2
The immigration case of Horst Nemetz shows even more clearly
how being seen as part of a gay couple may work both for and against
a litigant. A lower court denied Nemetz's petition for naturalization
solely because he had been involved in a long-term monogamous relationship with another male; the relationship and the sexual activity
were held to constitute evidence of bad moral character sufficient to
mandate exclusion. 0 3 The decision was reversed on appeal, and it is
possible that the appellate court reversed precisely because it was a
long-term monogamous relationship-it does not look like moral turpitude of the most horrifying kind. A comparison of the language of
the two Nemetz opinions may support this analysis. The district court
focuses almost obsessively on the couple's copulating, saying, "The
petitioner concedes having actively engaged in sexual relations with
his male roommate, more or less continuously, since 1967."' l The
subliminal image this sentence conjures up is of over ten years of near
non-stop copulation. The district court opinion is short and full of
abstract references to "bad moral character," "moral delinquency,"
"licentious living," and "the rising tide of this type of moral
,
decay. "105
The appeals court opinion, by contrast, focuses on the pair bonding
of Nemetz and his roommate. This opinion quotes extensively from
Nemetz's deposition detailing the nature of his relationship:
Q: Mr. Nemetz, are you now or have you ever been a homosexual?
A: I'm now.

101 Id. at 392.
102 Id. at 391; see also id. at 378 ("Tlhe Schneringer incident 'was the only time that
[petitioner] engaged in a homosexual act with anyone.' ").
103 Nemetz v. INS, 485 F. Supp. 470, 471 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir.
1981).
104 Id. at 470.
105 Id. at 471. Not all these fine phrases are used to describe the conduct of Nemetz and his
roommate. Some are directed to examples of homo- and heterosexual sodomitical behavior set
forth in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S.
901 (1976), in which the Nemetz district judge participated and which he commends, in
another unfortunate choice of words, for its "penetrating analysis" of the evils of sodomy.
Nemetz, 485 F. Supp. at 471.
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Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
Q:
A:

Do you have sexual relations with your roommate... ?
Well, we have a relationship. I like him.
Have you ever had sexual relationships with him?
What do you mean sexual relationships?
Intimate relationships. Getting into the sexual aspects.
Either yes or no.
Yes.

Q:

So what you're saying is that your relationship in the United
States has been with one individual. Is that correct?
Yes.
And no others?
That's right. Yeah.
And in your lifetime that is the only individual you've had a
relationship of this type with?
6
Yes. 0

A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Q:
The circuit court additionally uses extensive quotes from the deposition to emphasize the completely private nature of Nemetz's sexual
activities. It then concludes that "Nemetz in all respects sustained his
burden of proving good moral character."' 10 7 The case is unusual in

ruling in favor of a gay plaintiff who is still part of a sexually-active
couple. The excerpts quoted by the circuit court, however, somewhat
downplay the sexual aspects of the relationship and stress the affectional ones. Additionally, they show how discreet Nemetz has beenhe is not flaunting. Moreover, in contrast to the members of gay
couples who claim to be married, Nemetz is not arrogating heterosex10 8
ual privilege.
Having suggested both the ambivalence with which courts view visible gay couples and some reasons that may account for this, I shall
consider specific examples from each of three of Cain's categories of
litigants-public employees, gay bars, and student organizations-for
evidence of the treatment accorded the couples visible in them.

106Nemetz, 647 F.2d 432, 433-34.
107 Id. at 437.

108 The reaction might have been different if,
for example, Nemetz had claimed that his
relationship with an American citizen entitled him to the immigration status of a spouse. But
Nemetz is making no claim at all for his relationship, except perhaps that it should be ignored.
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VISIBLE PAIR BONDs IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION

Although in one sense all of the public employment discrimination
cases other than class actions brought by gay rights organizations
may be classified as "individual" rather than "couple" or "community" litigation, the employment cases can be further subdivided based
on the nature of the gay or lesbian activity the employer puts at issue.
For some, it is the purely individual assertion of sexual preference,
apart from any pair bonding, copulating, or gay community activities.' °9 For others it is chiefly participation in the gay community to
which the employer claims to object.110 Finally, coupling is put at
issue in several different ways.
My discussion of the shadowy couples moving through the employment litigation will focus on cases, like Shahar v. Bowers,III in which
the presence or potential of a pair bond is deemed important to the
employer or the court. Other forms of coupling do surface in the
employment arena, including reliance on specifically identified acts of
copulation as grounds for termination. 1 2 An absence of coupling is
also used as evidence that homosexual inclinations are transient, that
the person is not a real homosexual.
Of the employment cases I shall discuss in detail, most concern persons whose employer sought to terminate them after learning of their
109 See, e.g., BenShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 807 F.2d 982 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (involving
an action for reinstatement of reserve officer "discharged from the Army because she had
stated on several occasions that she was a homosexual, although there was no evidence that she
had actually ever engaged in a homosexual act").
110 See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498, 500 (4th Cir.) (upholding firing of
teacher not for giving press and television interviews "about the difficulties homosexuals
encounter" but for failure to include on his job application his college membership in the
Homophiles of Penn State), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
MIShahar v. Bowers, No. 1:91-CV-RCF (N.D. Ga. filed Oct. 5, 1991); see also Shahar v.
Bowers, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 668 (N.D. Ga. March 9, 1992) (denying motion to
dismiss).
112 See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that alleged
homosexual advance by NASA employee toward man he picked up in his car was not
sufficient to justify dismissal); Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372, 1373-74 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
(upholding discharge of employee for four specific sex acts with military personnel), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970); Moser v. State Bd. of Educ., 101 Cal. Rptr. 86, 87 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972) (revoking teacher's credentials after conviction for sex act in public restroom, described
in detail); cf. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding
military's action in asking officer to resign his commission after he visited Officers' Club in
company of gay enlisted man), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
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attempt to enter into a same-sex marriage. As noted above, such a
marriage is both a particularly visible and a particularly threatening
declaration of one's same-sex preference. Opponents view gay marriage as a most unsettling parody of opposite-sex behavior-it is like
going in drag. Indeed, although the courts' reasoning is never quite
made explicit, the most reliable predictor of failure for a gay litigant
in a public employment case has in the past1 1 been that, to his
employer's knowledge, he views himself as having a spouse of the
same sex. 114 The reaction of nonmilitary government employers to
their gay employees' attempts to marry approaches the vehemence of
the military. Such employers seek to characterize the attempt to
marry not merely as flaunting but as evidence of activism on behalf of
homosexual causes, regardless of the amount of publicity generated
by the marriage itself or the role, if any, the employee played in generating such publicity. Robin Shahar, for example, was fired solely for
having participated with another woman in a Jewish marriage ceremony. Her employer learned of this only when she informed him she
would be changing her last name from Brown to Shahar after getting
married over the summer before commencing employment. 11 5 In
response, she received a letter "withdrawing her offer of permanent
employment because of information received concerning 'a purported
marriage between [Shahar] and another woman.' "116 In seeking to
justify his actions to the court, Attorney General Bowers insisted,
inter alia,
"that Shahar 'pursued an activist role regarding the societal status of
homosexuals' is a proper inference drawn from the facts that
[p]laintiff purported to 'marry' another female, that she changed her
name to have the same name as her partner, and that she made the
fact of this 'marriage' public knowledge.""1 7
113 The courts in more recent cases are less hostile, but those cases, like Shahar, have yet to
result in a final decision. For speculation as to the reasons for change, see infra text
accompanying notes 220-23.
114 For attempts by various courts to find different, less convincing ways of distinguishing
successful from unsuccessful public employment litigants, see infra text accompanying notes
131-33. See also Childers v. Dallas Police Dept., 513 F. Supp. 134, 141 n.10 (1981) (claiming,
inaccurately, that the distinction is one of participation in demonstrations on behalf of
homosexual causes), aff'd, 669 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982).
115 Her partner also adopted the name Shahar, Hebrew for the "act of seeking God." See
Mark Curriden, A.G. Refuses to Hire Lesbian, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 32.
116 Shahar, 58 Fair Empl. Cas. (BNA) at 668.
117 Id. at 669 n.4 (quoting Defendant's Reply, at 4).
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To its credit, the court chastized Bowers for this and other unwarranted inferences in his summary judgment papers, saying:
At this time, the court is not convinced that telling one person of a
pending marriage makes it "public knowledge." Moreover, the court
does not agree that plaintiff's disclosure to her administrative supervisor of her pending plans logically implies that she "pursued an
activist role regarding the societal status of homosexuals" any more
than another employee's similar announcement of marriage to a person of the opposite gender implies that she "pursued an activist role"
regarding the societal status of heterosexuals.11
Other courts have been far more willing to conflate same-sex marriage, flaunting, and activism, and to hold all three against a visibly
coupled gay employee. Like Shahar, would-be university librarian J.
Michael McConnell had informed his prospective employer of his
intention to enter into a same-sex marriage before commencing
employment. He was warned that this "might well jeopardize
favorable consideration of [his] employment application," but proceeded nevertheless to apply for a marriage license, attracting the
attention of the local news media.1 19 Although McConnell "specifically denied arranging for the presence of the press at this event," the
court found what it described as "this antic" sufficient cause for denying McConnell employment. 120 Noting disapprovingly that McConnell was not merely someone with homosexual tendencies or "a desire
clandestinely to pursue homosexual conduct" the court accused him
of "seek[ing] employment on his own terms."1 2 1 It concluded:
118 Id.

119 McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 195 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046
(1972). The attempt to marry resulted in two reported decisions, Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (holding that marriage under Minnesota law required two persons of
opposite sex), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), and McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54,
55 (8th Cir. 1976) (denying increased veteran's benefits notwithstanding claim that McConnell
was the dependent spouse of Baker). Evidence external to the reported cases supports the
charge of activism, at least on the part of the man McConnell tried to marry. Jack Baker
acknowledged that "right from the start [he] tried to provoke a heterosexual backlash by
rhetorical and psychological confrontation," but that earlier efforts had failed in the face of
Minnesota tolerance. See Kay Tobin & Randy Wicker, The Gay Crusaders 14-46, 140-52
(1972). For example, his effort to shock his law school prom by dancing with his lover met not
with the anticipated resistance, but with acceptance. See id. at 141. Not until his wedding was
Baker able to stir up a reaction. See id. at 143-52.
120 McConnell, 451 F.2d at 195 n.4.
121 Id. at 196.
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[T]he prospective employee demands, as shown both by the allegations of the complaint and by the marriage license incident as well,
the right to pursue an activist role in implementing his unconventional ideas concerning the societal status to be accorded homosexuals
and, thereby, to foist tacit approval of this socially repugnant concept
upon his employer .... We know of no constitutional fiat or binding
principle of decisional law which requires an employer to accede to
122
such extravagent demands.
As Marc Fajer and others have pointed out, what is seen as
extravagent flaunting on the part of gay men and lesbians is routine,
even expected, behavior for heterosexuals in this society. Heterosexuals are free to reveal their status and preferences through public displays of affection as diverse as holding hands and sending out
wedding announcements. Conversations among heterosexuals about
"the process of forming couples" and one's life with one's partner are
"expected and appropriate . . . in social and work settings." 123
Indeed, a heterosexual employee who did what the court expected of
McConnell-who either declined to marry his partner or to tell his
employer he was doing so, who carried on a clandestine relationship--would be viewed by many as bizarre.
John Singer, a clerk typist who had informed his employer, the
EEOC, of his homosexuality at the time he was hired, was nevertheless subsequently fired for having "flaunted" it through both kinds of
coupling. 124 The EEOC faulted him both for "kissing and embracing
a male in front of the elevator in the building where he [had previously been] employed and kissing a male in [his former employer's]
company cafeteria"12' 5 and for applying with another man for a mar122
123

Id.
Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role

Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511, 604
(1992). Fajer concludes that "to be full participants in American social life, people must be
able to publicly discuss their partners and their search for partners." Id. at 605. While I
personally would prefer a world in which my sex life was not the business of the state, my
employer, my co-workers, nor of any one else with whom I was not on intimate terms (i.e., a
world in which discretion was a fashionable option for people of all sexual preferences), I take
Fajer's point that gay men and lesbians will not have achieved true equality until they are free
to publicize their coupling to the same extent heterosexuals now are expected to.
124 Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 249 (9th Cir. 1876), vacated,
429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
125 Id. It is important to note that neither of these incidents took place on EEOC premises,
or, indeed, while Singer was employed by the EEOC.
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riage license. 126 In a newspaper article, which identified his employer
as the EEOC, Singer was quoted "as saying, in part, that he and the
man he sought to marry were 'two human beings who happen to be in
love and want to get married for various reasons.' ,127 A close reading of the opinion suggests that those who opposed Singer were most
troubled by his public coupling. 128 The Civil Service Commission,
which, like the court, ruled against him, stressed not only his
"flaunt[ing]" and advocacy, but the possible revulsion of his co-workers, "their apprehension of homosexual advances and solicitations,"
and the danger that Singer might use his position "to foster homosexual activity, particularly among youth." 129 His conduct is repeatedly

described as "immoral" and "notoriously disgraceful." 130 The court,
131
somewhat puzzlingly, distinguishes his case from that of Acanfora,
who also gave interviews that mentioned both his homosexuality and
his government job, and from the student organization case of Bonner 132 on the grounds that "[n]either [of those cases] involved1 33
the
open and public flaunting or advocacy of homosexual conduct."
Employees who are open about their homosexuality but not about
any aspect of their coupling seem to fare better in court. Approvingly
contrasting the apparently unattached gay plaintiff before it with
Singer and McConnell, the court in Aumiller v. University of Delaware 134 noted that "Aumiller, by contrast, never engaged in comparable public conduct such as applying for a marriage license, kissing13a
man in public, or participating in homosexual demonstrations."'
Aumiller, a college drama teacher, is distinguished instead by various
refusals to couple: "Aumiller concluded.., he would not have a sexual relationship with anyone connected with the University, either a
Id.
127 Id. Their attempt to compel issuance of a marriage license was denied in Singer v. Hara,
522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
126

128 The charges against him also included complaints of his organizing on behalf of the gay
community, granting interviews in connection with the marriage license application and other

gay issues, and "indicat[ing] by his dress and demeanor at work that he intended to continue
homosexual activity as a 'way of life."' Singer, 530 F.2d at 249.
129 Id. at 250 n.3.
130 Id. at 249, 250.
131 See supra note 110.
132 See infra text accompanying notes 158-67.
133 Singer, 530 F.2d at 256.
134 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
135 Id. at 1293.
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student or an employee." 13 6 He did not have a sexual relationship
with his gay housemate. 137 Although quoted in a local paper as saying, "'We want to provide these gay people with a healthy, normal
way of meeting other homosexuals. Who would find their sex in a
bathroom if they could do it another way?' ",138 he insisted to the
court that he
in no way... intended to suggest that one of the purposes of the Gay
Community [a student organization with which he was affiliated] was
to help members find sex partners. Indeed, Aumiller emphatically
contends that the purpose is just the opposite: to provide homosexuals
with the opportunity13to9 meet other homosexuals in a completely nonsexual environment.
Aumiller's rhetoric enthusiastically supports long-term, monogamous
same-sex pair bonding: "'Many of our members are involved in longterm relationships,'" he told a reporter. "'Most gay people would
stay with one person, I think, if they were given the chance to meet
lots of homosexuals and find a compatible partner.' ,4 But the court
deciding his case was never forced to confront a real, live gay couple.
For a gay couple to seem threatening to an employer, it is not necessary that they formally seek to marry. When applying for a job
with the Dallas Police Department,
[plaintiff Steven] Childers said he wanted to be honest and told [his
interviewer] he was gay. Childers assured [the interviewer] that he
would not have to worry about him, however, because he (Childers)
was "married[."] His "spouse" was outside in the car. [The interviewer] claims... that at that point he determined that Childers was
Childers was telling him that
disqualified from the job.... [because]
14 1
he was an habitual lawbreaker.
Like the Dallas Police Department, the district court was prepared
to hold against Childers both his pair bonding and his copulating,
repeatedly noting with disapproval that Childers
136

Id. at 1283-84.

137 Id. at 1303.
138 Id. at 1317 (quoted from Jan de Blein, Gays: "There's No Need to Deny Fact," Says a

Homosexual Activist at U.D., Wilmington Sunday News-J., Nov. 2, 1975 (reprinted in full in
Aumiller)) .
139 Id. at 1298 (citations omitted).
140 Id. at 1317 (quoted from de Blein, supra note 138).
141 Id. at 138.
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admitted freely that he cohabited in a sexual relationship with
another man ....
Donald Armstrong, to whom plaintiff referred as
his "spouse[,"] prior to, during and following his [police department]
interviews ....
Plaintiff lived with Donald Armstrong from 1973 to
1975, and he engaged in sexual relations with Armstrong several
times a week for the entire two and a half years.' 42

While, as the court indicates, the copulating likely violated the Texas
sodomy laws, 14 3 the pair bonding additionally "was in flagrant violation of police regulations."' 144
On the other hand, the discriminatory Defense Department security clearance review procedure approved by the court in High Tech
Gays v. Defense Industry Security Clearance Office 14 5 seems to favor
pair bonding over promiscuity. The Defense Department manual
directed investigators to learn not only the" 'nature and full extent of
deviant acts engaged in [so as to] determine if the SUBJECT's activities involve actual violation of criminal statutes' ,146 but also "'the
types of individuals with whom the SUBJECT participates in deviant
activity.' "147 The investigators are directed to "'[d]etermine if the
SUBJECT maintains a single or a small number of lasting relationships or effects numerous transient and temporary liasons with a vari142 Id. at 141, 144, 147 n.21.

143The Texas sodomy law prohibits homosexual oral and anal sex, but no other activities.
See infra text accompanying notes 217-20. While the court finds that Childers "admitted to
engaging regularly in homosexual sexual activity which is prohibited by" the sodomy statute,
513 F. Supp. at 144, and while he may have made this admission explicitly in a portion of the
record not cited in the opinion, the text of the opinion details only admissions of gay sexual
activity, without specifying anything that would constitute criminal sodomy in Texas. Is the
judge simply assuming not only that all sexually active gay men violate the sodomy laws, but
that any gay sex is such a violation? A strict grammatical reading of the judge's language
quoted above would suggest that he is making this assumption. Specifically, the reference is to
"homosexual sexual activity which is prohibited," not to "activity that is prohibited"; this use
of a nonrestrictive rather than a restrictive clause either makes all "homosexual sexual
activity" criminal sodomy or makes the judge guilty of a grammatical error at least as common
and as rarely prosecuted as violations of the sodomy laws. For an explication of the rhetorical
move that elides the difference between sodomy and homosexuality, see Janet E. Halley,
Reasoning About Sodomy, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1721, 1737 (1993) (describing sodomy as the
metonym for homosexuals.).
144 Childers,513 F. Supp. at 146. Specifically, the couple allegedly violated "[s]ection 15(G)
of the Code of Conduct which prohibits cohabitation with a sex pervert of the same sex." Id.
at 144.
145 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
146 Id. at 568.
147 Id.

HeinOnline -- 79 Va. L. Rev. 1675 1993

1676

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 79:1643

ety of individuals through chance meetings in bars or other public
places.' ,,148 The Defense Department's emphasis on lasting relationships may reflect the changing times-society in the 1990s may be
more willing to accept both heterosexual and homosexual pair bonding outside of marriage and to judge promiscuity more harshly. 149
VI.

SHADOWY COUPLING IN THE GAY COMMUNITY LITIGATION

One way of interpreting the gay bar and student organization cases
is that these sites for the formation of the gay community trouble the
legal system chiefly to the extent that they are also sites for the formation of gay couples. In these cases, the "pairing off" which draws
censure may lead to pair bonding, copulation, both, or neither. Opponents of the gay community, however, assume that it is the prelude to
sodomy and react accordingly.
As Professor Cain's discussion of the factors considered by courts
in the gay bar cases makes clear, the more coupling that was going on,
the more people were getting together in pairs, the more troubled
courts were by the gay bars. 150 Although the police and liquor licensing authorities seem bothered enough by any bar that attracts the gay
community, most courts find the mere presence of gay patrons, even
in large numbers, unproblematic. A bar can be "a meeting place" or
"'hangout'" for the gay community without thereby jeopardizing its
license.' 5 ' But the moment the patrons start coupling, the courts
begin to take more notice.
148 Id. Although the district court criticized it for its negative inference, DISCO faulted one
applicant for his "visits to gay bathhouses" and "homosexual activity with casual
acquaintances," High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1378 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), rev'd, 595 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
149 The threat of AIDS, for example, has been credited with promoting the ideal of
monogamy among both gays and straights.
150 See Cain, supra note 1, at 1567-72; see also M.J. Greene, Annotation, Sale of Liquor to
Homosexuals or Permitting Their Congregation at Licensed Premises As Ground For
Suspension or Revocation of Liquor License, 27 A.L.R.3d 1254, 1266-67 (1969) (summarizing
what activities courts will and will not accept at licensed premises).
151 Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969, 971 (Cal. 1951); accord Kerma Restaurant Corp. v.
State Liquor Auth., 233 N.E.2d 833, 834 (N.Y. 1967). But see Inman v. City of Miami, 197
So.2d 50, 51-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (upholding an ordinance that prohibited a liquor licensee,
inter alia, "to knowingly allow two or more homosexual persons to congregate or remain in his
place of business" because "[tihe object of the ordinance as a whole is to prevent the
congregation at liquor establishments of persons likely to prey upon the public by attempting
to recruit other persons for acts which have been declared illegal by the Legislature of the
State), cert. denied, 201 So.2d 895 (Fla. 1967), and cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
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Several California cases underline this distinction. In Kershaw v.
Departmentof Alcoholic Beverage Control,'52 a license revocation was
sustained "where there was conduct on the premises by homosexuals
who openly sought and obtained sexual satisfaction by aberrant methods."'15 3 The conduct enumerated at considerable length is an indiscriminate mix of copulation (e.g., fondling of a partner's genitals),
pair bonding ("one male couple declared that they had been married
some three months and displayed their wedding rings"), and the sort
of public displays of affection that can be a prelude to either (e.g.,
"[s]ome of the male couples danced cheek to cheek in close
embrace"); the court makes no apparent distinction between these
154
various sorts of activities.
And in Vallerga v. DepartmentofAlcoholic Beverage Control, - 5 the
California Supreme Court went on to say:
Conduct which may fall short of agressive and uninhibited participation in fulfilling the sexual urges of homosexuals... may nevertheless
offend good morals and decency by displays in public which do no
more than manifest such urges. This is not to say that homosexuals
might properly be held to a higher degree of moral conduct than are
heterosexuals. But any public display which manifests sexual desires,
whether they be heterosexual or homosexual in nature may, and his1 56
torically have been, suppressed and regulated in a moral society.
152318 P.2d 494 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
153 Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 347 P.2d 909, 911 (Cal. 1959)
(discussing the holding in Kershaw). For the Kershaw court, "[sleeking and obtaining sexual
satisfaction with a person of the same sex is considered an aberrant method by the great
majority of people. The methods of copulation available to two persons of the same sex would
certainly be so regarded." 318 P.2d at 497.
154Kershaw, 318 P.2d at 496. The Vallerga court also noted that "[iln the Nickola case, the
court held generally that seeking sexual gratification in a public tavern with another of the
same sex would offend the moral sense of the general public." Vallerga, 347 P.2d at 912
(discussing the holding in Nickola v. Munro, 328 P.2d 271, 276 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)).
Nickola also includes a lengthy and indiscriminate catalogue of coupling behavior, from
relatively mild ("men dancing with each other in close and affectionate embrace"), 328 P.2d at
272, to questionable ("Some of the male dancers, while dancing, wrapped their arms around
the buttocks of their companions and vigorously rotated their pelvic areas, to the evident
enjoyment of other patrons."), id., to indisputably lewd ("Another agent saw a male patron
fondle the private parts of a Negro patron for a period of several seconds."). Id. at 273. The
court seems to take a particular interest in the interracial aspects of the coupling, which it sets
forth in detail as the culmination of a list of acts of apparently increasing perversity.
155347 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1959).
156 Id. at 912. The court noted that:
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When the Vallerga court details the evidence of coupling in an Oak-

land bar, however, it becomes clear that homosexuals are being held
to a higher standard, faulted for much conduct that is routine and
acceptable among heterosexual couples in bars. But, because the trier
of fact had not relied on this evidence of coupling, but instead on the
mere fact that the premises were "a resort for sexual perverts, to wit,
homosexuals" 15 7 (that is to say for the gay community and gay indi-

viduals rather than gay couples), the court felt compelled to reverse
the license revocation.
Although most of the gay bar cases date from the 1950s and reflect
then-current attitudes, a similar fear of couples and coupling seems to
drive the university administrators who have more recently sought to
ban or restrict gay and lesbian student organizations on campus. For
example, the University of New Hampshire gave limited recognition
to its Gay Students Organization, but banned it from holding social
functions after Governor Meldrim Thompson, Jr., expressed outrage
over a dance sponsored by the group. 158 First on Virginia Commonwealth University's list of reasons for denying registration to the Gay
Alliance of Students, an organization that "[tiogether with providing
educational activities . . . conducts social activities, including
dances"' 15 9 was that recognition "would increase the opportunity for
homosexual contacts. ''l 60 The University of Missouri refused to rec[P]atrons usually paired off, men with men, and women with women. During the
period of surveillance police officers testified that they observed women dancing with
other women, and women kissing other women. A policewoman testified that as she
and a companion policewoman sat at a table a female patron dressed in mannish attire
sat down and said to her companion, "You're a cute little butch." Later in the evening
this patron kissed the policewoman, and a waitress came by and warned the participants
that if they wanted to continue such activity they should go into the restroom.... A
police officer testified that he observed a male patron and a grey-haired man approach,
embrace each other at the bar, put their foreheads together while they carried on a
whispered conversation, and that the grey-haired man then kissed the other and stated
to the bartender: "Arley and I are going steady."
Id. at 913. In addition, the court includes evidence of crossdressing by bar patrons, evidence
that further confirms its anti-homosexual bias and the disingenuousness of its claim to equal
treatment of gays and straights. Id. According to the California Supreme Court: "The foregoing is sufficient evidence of a display of sexual desires and urges which, when made in a public
place as a continuing course of conduct, could reasonably be found by the trier of fact to be
'contrary to public welfare and morals.'" Id.
157Id. (quoting the lower court).
158 Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 654 (1st Cir. 1974).
159 Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 163 (4th Cir. 1976).
160 Id. at 164.

HeinOnline -- 79 Va. L. Rev. 1678 1993

1993]

Commentary

1679

ognize the organization Gay Lib "on the ground that recognition...
would probably result in the commission of felonious acts of sodomy
161
in violation of Missouri law."
Perhaps to counter these concerns, gay and lesbian student organizations involved in litigation almost always state their purposes as
including dialogue with nongays on campus and rarely stress a desire
to bring gay students together for any purpose whatsoever, let alone
one that moves beyond community building to coupling. 16 2 Appellate
courts have consistently ruled in favor of the student organizations on
First Amendment grounds.16 3 Yet dissenting judges continue to echo
the fears of the universities that gay student organizations, however
restrained their aims or activities, will inevitably lead to more homosexual coupling. Like Justice William H. Rehnquist, dissenting from
the denial of certiorari in the University of Missouri case, these dissenters see no constitutional obstacle to denying "recognition to an
organization the activities of which expert psychologists testify will in
and of themselves lead directly to violations of a concededly valid
161 Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1080 (1978); see also Gay Activists Alliance v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 638
P.2d 1116, 1121 (Okla. 1981) (same); Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361,
363 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting one student senator arguing, "We cannot use state money to
support a homosexual group. What if a group of students/arsonists wanted to start an
arsonists club and start fires. Would you fund them? ... It's the same thing as funding
homosexuals."). The controversy continues to the present day. See, e.g., Leaping into the
Fray Over Gay Group At Auburn, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1992 (detailing efforts by legislators,
students and university administrators to restrict gay student group).
162 See Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1001 (1985). To rebut the testimony of a university witness who claimed,
"'It would be a shock really, if there were not homosexual acts engaged in at or immediately
after' a meeting of a homosexual student organization," a witness for Gay Student Services
tried to show that "GSS was a typical student service group ... rather than a substitute for a
gay singles bar." Id. at 1323; see also Bonner, 509 F.2d at 654 n.1 (noting that gay group listed
four purposes for organization; the first three involved outreach to the broader community and
only the last, "not least important... [was] to give bisexual and homosexual members of the
college community a place to communicate with each other and form discussion groups so that
a healthy gay consciousness can evolve among students."); Gay Lib, 558 F.2d at 850 (listing
five purposes, four of which involved outreach to the broader community); Aumiller v.
University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1298 (D. Del. 1977) (involving the faculty
supervisor of a gay student group whose job is on the line and who denies that the group aims
to help members find sex partners).
163 Gohn, 850 F.2d 361; Texas A & M, 737 F.2d 1317; Gay Lib, 558 F.2d 848; Gay Alliance,
544 F.2d 162; Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (lst Cir. 1974);
Student Servs. for Lesbians/Gays and Friends v. Texas Tech, 635 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Texas
1986).
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state criminal law."' 164 Rehnquist coyly notes that, while Gay Lib
"disavow[s] any intent to advocate present violations of state law, the
organization intends to engage in far more than political discussion.' 1 65 He then lists three of the organizations purposes: to provide
information on homosexuality, without "proselytiz[ing or] . .
recruit[ing, to enable] people who have already established a pattern
of homosexuality when they enter college [to] adjust to this fact" and
to "help the gay community to rid itself of... guilt.' 1 66 For him
these purposes were sufficiently pernicious to justify university exclusion. Endorsing the notion of homosexuality as contagious, he agreed
with the University that "the question is more akin to whether those
suffering from measles have a constitutional right, in violation of
quarantine regulations, to associate together and with others who do
not presently have measles, in order to urge repeal of a state law pro1 67
viding that measle sufferers be quarantined."
VII.

THE PROBLEM WITH MAKING COPULATION MORE VISIBLE

Having examined some of the strengths and weaknesses of one
form of coupling, the pair bond, as a focus for gay rights litigation, I
want briefly to consider the other form, copulating. Two of the participants in this symposium, albeit in very different ways and for different reasons, 168 have suggested, if I understand them correctly, that
in a post-Hardwick world advocates for gay men and lesbians might
do well to focus more than they have previously on specific forms of
copulation. Both Janet Halley and Pat Cain urge a renewed attention
to the details of the sodomy statutes, the former to remind us of the
specific conduct they prohibit, the latter to distinguish the myriad
forms of gay and lesbian sexuality that the statutes do not traditionally encompass.
164 Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to Gay Lib, 558 F.2d 848; see also Gay Activists Alliance, 638 P.2d at 1126 (Barnes, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Rehnquist's opinion on this point).
165 Ratchford, 434 U.S. at 1083.
166

Id.

167 Id. at 1084.
168Among other differences, Cain's is chiefly a litigation strategy, while it seems that
Halley's is focused on political and legislative activity.
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Professor Halley wishes to explore the political possibility of "alliances along a register of acts" 169 by working both to dissolve the ilusory identity between sodomy and the homosexual and to "exploit[ ]
and . . . undermine[ heterosexual identity] from within." 7 ' She
extends a word of caution both to those whose oral and anal sex is
exclusively heterosexual (and is, as such, still proscribed by sodomy
laws in over a dozen states)17 1 and to those who see any same-sex
erotic contact as "evict[ing its participants] from the class of heterosexuals" and defining them "necessarily and unproblematically [as]
homosexuals." 17 2 Her goal is an "alliance of sodomites" focused on

acts, not identities. 173
While Professor Halley wishes to stress the similarities between
homosexual and other forms of sodomy, Professor Cain wishes to
stress the differences between the homosexual sodomy whose
criminalization was authorized in Hardwick and all other homosexual
conduct, sexual and nonsexual.1 74 She wishes, in effect, to limit the
Hardwick holding to its particular facts. 175 Cain urges those who litigate on behalf of gay men and lesbians to focus the court's attention
on the details of the conduct their clients have engaged in. First, she
claims, a focus on "proven rather than presumed conduct" would
help prevent courts from inferring "conduct... from the mere fact of
169 Halley, supra note 143, at 1722. Or, as Michael Hardwick put it, "All you gotta do...

is make 'em realize it affects them, too. Then most heterosexuals are 100 percent behind you.
Most people don't understand what sodomy is. They think it's some crazy, unnatural act."
By explaining to his married heterosexual business associate in graphic terms what sodomy is,
Hardwick gets the man to realize that sodomy is what he does with his wife. Art Harris, supra
note 39, at Cl.
170 Halley, supra note 143, at 1722.
171 For a useful overview in the form of a map of the United States with symbols indicating
the activities each one proscribes, see The Geography of Desire, Details, June 1993, at 26-27.
For a more scholarly, although somewhat dated rendition of some of this information,
complete with statutory citations, see Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the
Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1508, 1519-21 (1989).
172 Halley, supra note 143, at 1738.
173 Id. at 1771. The T-shirt marketed by the University of Virginia Gay and Lesbian Law
Students Association might be a good symbol of this alliance. The shirt bears the legend
"FELON" in bold black letters on the front and on the back the text of the Virginia sodomy
law, which criminalizes both homosexual and heterosexual oral and anal sex. The shirt is in
great demand among heterosexuals of my acquaintance, including two who requested it as a

wedding present.
174 See Cain, supra note 1, at 1624-27, 1633-36.
175 Id. at 1635.
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status." 176 Second, she insists that "[w]hen sexual conduct is at issue,
gay rights litigators need to be explicit about what the conduct is" so
as to distinguish it from the sodomy at issue in Hardwick.177 To the
extent that Cain is urging a focus on acts that are not, by any stretch
178
of the imagination, sex acts, I have no quarrel with her project.

The objection I do have to both Halley's and Cain's suggestion that
gay rights advocates focus on the details of sexual activity is a practi-

cal one-I simply do not think either proposal will work to achieve
the desired ends.' 79 It seems from an examination of the litigation
history that the closer the issue gets to the gay couple copulating, the
more problematic it is for courts and legislators. Opening the door,
176 Id. at 1627.
177 Id. at 1633-34.
178 1 agree, for example, that Shahar should stress that she is not being penalized for sexual

conduct, but for "her religious celebration of a personal relationship." Id. at 1638. I also
endorse Cain's general emphasis on continuing to make substantive due process as well as
equal protection arguments. My concern is that, whatever the constitutional rubric under
which it is introduced, detailed discussion of sexual practices will not advance the cause of
gays and lesbians in the courts. Whatever its limits as a slogan for the military, "Don't ask,
don't tell" may remain a sensible approach to the discussion of sex acts in litigation.
179 Both proposals may have limited usefulness in appropriate cases, however. Consider, for
example, the recent, widely publicized Virginia decision transferring custody of a young boy
from his lesbian mother, Sharon Bottoms, to his maternal grandmother. Of the numerous
reasons reported for depriving the mother of custody, one is vulnerable to a one-two punch
from Cain and Halley. Judge Buford M. Parsons, Jr., apparently ruled that, because the
mother and her lover had admitted engaging in oral sex, they were acknowledged felons under
the laws of Virginia. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., "Judge's Decision in Custody Case Raises
Concerns, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1993, at A9. Virginia does make oral sex a felony, but
regardless of the gender or even the marital status of the participants. See VA. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-361 (Michie Supp. 1993). On its face, Virginia law condemns oral sex between married
couples equally with same-sex activity. Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (upholding
sodomy prosecution for consensual oral sex between husband and wife, albeit in presence of
third party and recorded in photographs that fell into the hands of the wife's minor children),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). Moreover, Virginia law requires penetration for oral sex to
be a crime; in the case of cunnilingus this has been held to mean penetration of the vagina by
the tongue. See Ryan v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 698 (1978). In line with Cain's
suggestion, an even more detailed examination of Bottoms's sexual practices might well have
revealed that they were not felonious after all-not all oral sex is sodomy. Furthermore, as
Halley would remind us, the judge's holding, by its terms, endangers the parental rights of
most Virginians: if violation of the sodomy law makes one an unfit parent, few heterosexuals
are immune. Nevertheless, these combined strategies would not have changed the result for
Sharon Bottoms. Judge Parsons additionally listed a number of independent grounds for his
decision, among them that homosexuality is "immoral" and that the child would suffer from
gender confusion. Drummond, supra, at A9.
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not merely of the closet but also of the bedroom, does not dissipate
but rather intensifies the problem.
To focus, as Cain would wish, on the details of sexual conduct for
the purpose of showing that none of a particular litigant's sexual conduct violates the relevant sodomy law seems to me to miss the
point.1 80 Such a focus would address neither what the proponents of
gay rights want nor what their opponents fear.""1 Both proponents
and opponents are generally concerned with a broad spectrum of
same-sex eroticism. Opponents rarely limit their discomfort or their
objections to the four corners of a sodomy statute and it is unlikely
that they would be satified by a pledge on the part of all homosexuals
to abide by the laws now on the books. And although some gay men
or lesbians might be prepared to take such a pledge in order to keep
their jobs, 8 2 1 doubt that any would find this a satisfactory solution.
What proponents wish to claim on behalf of gay men and lesbians is
exactly what would make opponents uncomfortable-the freedom to
express same-sex desires. So, while Cain's technical dodge may save
one or two individuals from losing their jobs, it may do more harm
than good to her cause in the long term.
The best way I can think of to prove this point will require some
fairly graphic discussion of sexual practices. I propose to provide a
taxonomy of sexual practices centered on the sodomy laws and to
examine both Cain's and Halley's proposal in light of this taxonomy.
I will then test their suggestions against some of the recent history of
the regulation of same-sex copulation. If some readers find parts of
this discussion offensive, I may, unfortunately, have doubly proven
my point-it is simply not a good strategy for advocates of gay and
Is0 Unless, of course, the litigant is only in court on a charge of sodomy.

181It is, in this respect, analogous to proposing the following solution to the abortion
problem: If abortion is intolerable because it kills the fetus, and if our law imposes only a duty
not to kill rather than a duty to rescue, then let us outlaw only methods of abortion, such as D
& C, that necessarily destroy the fetus; mandate instead that the fetus be removed very
carefully and made available to a right-to-life advocate, who may take whatever steps possible

to keep it alive. If the fetus, because it is not yet viable, nevertheless dies, it will no longer be a
murder victim, but rather one of countless who die for want of adequate nutrition and medical
attention. This is a technical dodge that provides little meaningful recognition to either the

right to life or reproductive freedom. Like Cain's proposal with respect to gay sex, it is likely
to satisfy no one. Cf. Polikoff, supra note 34, at 1541-43 (noting how abortion rights advocates

can be imprisoned by the limits of their rhetoric).
182 This is apparently the premise on which the Clinton Administration military policy on
gays, if taken at face value, is based.

HeinOnline -- 79 Va. L. Rev. 1683 1993

1684

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 79:1643

lesbian rights to push the legal discourse about sexual orientation far
in the direction of explicit consideration of the details of copulation.
What shocks the legal academy is unlikely to find favor with courts
18 3
and legislatures.
Taking the sodomy laws as our organizing principle, we can divide
the universe of same-sex copulation into three categories. The first is
18 4
conduct specifically proscribed by such statutes, today typically
contact (often requiring penetration) between the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another (i.e., oral and anal intercourse). The second is conduct that, although not generally proscribed by such statutes, would probably be looked upon by anyone
favoring the criminalization of homosexual acts as at least as troubling, revolting, or worthy of condemnation as traditional sodomy.' 8 5
Included in this category might be, for example, fisting, 1 86 penetration
with other objects, anilingus, and sadomasochism. The failure of
some states with sodomy statutes to criminalize these sorts of activities seems to reflect lack of legislative imagination 87 more than lack
of legislative will or a perceived limitation on legislative power. 88
183When I delivered this paper at the symposium, it seemed that some in the audience
heard only one word in the entire discussion--"fistfucking." Others were made uncomfortable
even by the use of such words as "penis." One can scarcely expect greater broadmindedness
from the average judge, juror, or legislator than from those who choose to attend a symposium
on "Sexual Orientation and the Law."
184While sodomy is "an utterly confused category," delving into that confusion is well
beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that, while I am aware of the diversity of ways
sodomy has been and continues to be defined, it seems unnecessary to rehearse them here. For
insight into the problem of defining sodomy, see Halley, supra note 143, at 1760-67.
185Cf. Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex, in The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, 3, 19
("Some of the most detested erotic behaviors ... are not as closely or completely regulated by
the criminal justice system as somewhat less stigmatized practices . . . . Areas of sexual
behavior come under the purview of the law when they become objects of social concern and
political uproar.").
186The insertion of the hand of one person into the anus or vagina of another.
187Thus, for example, legend has it that Queen Victoria insisted that prohibitions on lesbian
sex be stricken from a draft statute because she could not imagine that women could do such
things. An alternate explanation for the failure of some jurisdictions to criminalize is an
unwillingness to stimulate the imagination of those regulated; the argument appears to be that
describing what is to be prohibited will only give people ideas about sexual practices they
might never have dreamed up on their own. Other jurisidictions, have, however, criminalized
some of the practices listed here. See, e.g., the discussion of the Texas statute, which, for
example, criminalized penetration with objects, infra text accompanying notes 217-18.
188 There are many possible explanations as to why certain sex acts, but not others, have
been criminalized. For example, it may be that the more closely same-sex behavior is seen to
"parody" behaviors at the core of conventional heterosexuality, the more readily it will be
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The third category comprises conduct that, while perhaps disturbing
to opponents of homosexuality, would generally be considered, even
by them, to be "milder" than sodomy. This category includes everything from mutual masturbation to kissing and handholding; there is
greater room in this category for uncertainty as to both the will and
the power to regulate.1 89
Using this rubric, what must the litigational and sexual situation of
litigants be for them to benefit from Cain's suggestion that they focus
on proven sexual conduct and seek to distinguish it from sodomy?
The details of the sodomy statutes have varying potential relevance to
different sorts of litigants. 190 Consider three prototypical government
employees: a back office clerk, a high school teacher, and an assistant
attorney general. The clerk can most readily argue that there is no
nexus between the job and private consensual sex acts, whatever they
may be and whatever relation they may have to proscribed sodomy; 191
s/he does not need Cain's strategy. The precise contours of the law
are similarly of minor importance in the school teacher's case:
because the employer will likely be able to claim that the moral standards required of a role model for youth go beyond those set by the
criminal law, Cain's strategy will not suffice. Only with law enforcement personnel is it plausible for the issue to be, not the relevance of
homosexual conduct generally, but the relationship of that conduct to
criminal sodomy.
If there is a paradigm case for Cain's strategy, it would thus seem to
be that of someone in Robin Shahar's litigational posture. Shahar is a
punished. This approach would help account for both the strong hostile reaction to gay
marriage and the widespread criminalization of anal intercourse.
189 Some practices are somewhat more difficult to classify under this schema. What of
tribadism (technically, the rubbing of one set of female genitals against another), condemned
for centuries, but now legal almost everywhere in the United States? Consider cunnilingusover time, some jurisdictions have classified all contact between the mouth and the female sex
organs as sodomy, others have required the penetration of the vagina by the tongue. Still
others, by requiring the participation of a penis for sodomy, have excluded all lesbian sex from
the category. For a discussion of the legal treatment of specific lesbian sex acts, see generally
Ruthann Robson, Crimes of Lesbian Sex, in Lesbian (Out)Law 47-59 (1992).
190 A particular sexual orientation might be dangerous in one profession and irrelevant to
another. Necrophilism... might be objectionable in a funeral director or embalmer,
urolagnia in a laboratory technician, ... or dendrophilia in an arborist, yet none of
these unusual tastes would seem to warrant disciplinary action against a geologist or a
shorthand reporter.
Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 385 n.21 (Cal. 1969).
191 See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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litigant in a civil case, not a criminal prosecution for same-sex copulation. She resides in a state with a sodomy statute, 192 indeed the very
statute upheld in Hardwick. Although there is no direct evidence that
her sexual activities fell afoul of this statute, they were directly put at
issue when her prospective employer conflated her same-sex marriage
with sodomitical sex. Expert testimony on sexual practices might
cure Bowers of his misconception that all lesbian sex is sodomy. 193 In
addition, it might be of some advantage to Shahar if she could show,
not only that she did not violate the sodomy law, but that all of her
sexual conduct was appreciably "milder" than sodomy: perhaps Bowers would be mollified if Shahar and her partner confined themselves
to hugging and kissing. 194 The couple could then seek to assimilate
themselves to the previously respectable and desexualized category
of
95
female romantic friendships represented by "Boston marriage."'
But what if the sexual activities of a litigant like Shahar fell instead
on what Dan Ortiz has called "the far side of sodomy"? 1 96 Would
either an employer or a court be favorably impressed by the explanation that she had never violated the sodomy laws because she confined
herself to acts generally deemed kinkier still than sodomy? 197 What
difference would it make whether her avoidance of illegal acts was the
coincidental result of her personal sexual tastes or stemmed instead
from a scrupulous desire to abide by the law?
Limiting Hardwick to its particular facts works only if one can
articulate a reason why the particular sex act at issue should be
accorded different treatment from that given acts covered by the
Georgia sodomy law. 198 I see no reason to think that this can be done
192Those in states that do not criminalize homosexual sodomy need, at most, only discuss
the specifics of their sexual conduct to the extent necessary to show that it violates no other
laws, e.g., those concerning sex performed in public. They can argue about the implications
that should be drawn from the decision not to criminalize any private consensual same-sex
behavior without bringing in the specifics of their own conduct.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66 for his assumption that the two are identical.
194 Of course, Bowers could still argue "bad tendency," as he did with respect to Shahar's
nonsexual coupling activity (i.e., her marriage).
195See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
196 University of Virginia Law Professor Dan Ortiz has used this phrase in discussions.
197 In other words, those acts listed supra in category two.
198 Note that the Supreme Court in Hardwick already ignores the distinction between
sodomy as most traditionally defined (i.e., anal intercourse) and the oral sex with which
Hardwick was charged. As critics have noted, the long historical record of criminalization on
which Justice White relied applied only to anal sex. See Anne B. Goldstein, History,
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effectively with respect to those acts on the "far side of sodomy" in
199

category two.
Even with respect to same-sex acts considered "milder" than traditional sodomy, Cain's strategy of limiting Hardwick has so far failed
to carry the day in court. Shortly after Hardwick, the Missouri
Supreme Court heard a challenge to that portion of its sodomy statute
criminalizing "any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and
the... hand... of another." 2°° The defendant had been charged
with attempting to violate this statute because he "touched Det.
Steven Zielinski's genitalia through his clothing and such conduct was
a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of sexual misconduct with Det. Zielinski." 201 This would seem an excellent test
case for Cain's theory, involving as it does the sort of conduct not
traditionally encompassed by sodomy and clearly not construed as
unimaginable or worse. 20 2 Her approach, however, was accepted by
only one dissenter.2 °3 The majority disposes of this argument as well
as a wide variety of other arguments made by the ACLU as, for example, "ludicrous" and "without merit." 2°4 The court reads as Hardwick's holding that the Constitution does not confer upon consenting
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 97 Yale L.J. 1073, 1085-86 (1988).
199An unstated assumption of Cain's proposal may therefore be that she sees only the first
and third of my categories of same-sex acts: sodomy in her conceptual scheme may mark the
outer boundary of the proscribable. Anything worse is unimaginable; anything not proscribed
is more defensible in the eyes of the legal system.
200 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.010 (Vernon 1993).
201 State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 509 (Mo. 1986) (emphasis added).
202 Missouri is quite unsusual in criminalizing this sort of contact when consensual.
Unfortunately for Halley's alliance of sodomites, it only does so when the hand and the
genitals belong to two persons of the same sex. See also Robson, supra note 189, at 53
("Among the broadest of these statutes are ones that clearly target same-sex activities. For
example, Montana's criminalization of 'deviate sexual intercourse' includes 'any touching of
the sexual or other intimate parts of another [of the same sex] for the purposes of arousing or
gratifying the sexual desire of either party.").
203 Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 514 (Blackmar, J., dissenting). Like Cain, Judge Blackmar argued
that the statute went
beyond the limits of state power in defining "deviate sexual intercourse" as involving
the hand. This is not the offense of sodomy as discussed in [Hardwick] and it has no
long history of legal sanction such as seemed very important to Justice White in that
case. [Hardwick] . . . holds that [the] right of privacy does not extend to offenses
traditionally punished as sodomy. Its rationale is absent here.
Id. (citations omitted) (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 511.
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homosexuals a fundamental right to engage insodomy.205 It readily
concludes from this "that there is no fundamental right under the
United States Constitution to engage in private consensual homosexual activity. 20 6 Both Cain and Halley may well criticize this leap of
logic, but it seems their criticisms will have little success as a litigation
strategy. Aside from the lone dissenter in Missouri, the only other
judge Cain cites in support of her approach is the reversed district
court judge in High Tech Gays.20 7
Ordinarily, the fact that a new strategy has not yet worked is no
particularly good reason to stop trying it. But the limited likelihood
of success must be weighed together with the substantial costs and
risks of Cain's proposal. The first cost is political-the proposal may
fracture the gay community into "sodomites" and "nonsodomites."
Gay and lesbian advocates have vehemently resisted other opportunities to divide the community into more and less acceptable subgroups
so as to benefit the more mainstream while further excluding the
rest. 208 These advocates should find this potential division just as
troubling, particularly given the comparatively limited number of
people unequivocally in the "nonsodomite" category.
The second cost is more personal, to be borne by the individual
litigants-the details of whose sex lives will now be paraded before the
courts and their employers. Try as she might, Cain cannot limit her
proposal to carefully chosen plaintiffs, with mild sexual tastes and the
willingness to talk about them. Nor can an individual litigant easily
control the contours of the discussion. If "[p]laintiffs like Padula...
testify in detail about what it means to be a 'practicing homosexual'"

205 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.

206 Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 511 (emphasis added). Moreover, the majority opinion in
Hardwick itself says that "homosexual activity" generally, rather than just sodomy in
particular, has no connection to the values protected in earlier privacy cases. Hardwick, 478
U.S. at 191.
207 High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp 1366, 1370-72
(N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th cir. 1990); see Cain, supra note 1, at 1635. The
High Tech Gays appeals court used reasoning similar to that of the Missouri Supreme Court in
Walsh. See 895 F.2d at 571.
208 See, e.g., Ettelbrick, supra note 32, at 403 (opposing gay marriage because, inter alia, it
would divide the community into married insiders and unmarried outsiders who "would
clearly face increased sexual oppression.").
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and no longer avoid a "focus on sex ' 2°9 they may open the door 210 to
explicit questioning as to what they do in bed. Either the specifics of
sexual practices are relevant or they are not, both within a case and
within a line of cases. I do not want to give employers in the future
any excuse to pry further into the sexual practices of applicants and
employees. And, whether courts respond with prurient fascination or
revulsion to the sexual practices litigants testify about, I rarely see
such testimony benefitting a litigant.
This brings me to the third category of risk, which is that the legal
211 will
system's "negative judgment against all things homosexual"
only be intensified the more it is forced to confront the details of gay
sex-the system is squeamish enough about sex and homosexuality
taken separately. Combined and made more vivid, the two will likely
provoke a worse reaction than they already do separated and
sanitized.
Halley's proposal presents fewer risks than Cain's, but its usefulness may have similar limitations. As with Cain's proposal, the
potential for Halley's alliance seems strongest the "milder" the sex
acts in question are by conventional standards. Moreover, it, too,
would divide the gay community, this time along an even more controversial axis-the alliance would benefit those whose sexual activity
most closely resembles that of the majority of heterosexuals and
exclude those most different from heterosexuals in their practices.212
Even a limited alliance, however, depends on a perception on the part
of heterosexuals that there is a fundamental identity or similarity
between acts they perform and those performed by homosexuals.
From a purely physical standpoint, there can be no dispute about
this-mouths and penises, for example, fit together in exactly the
209 Cain, supra note 1, at 1639.

210 1 use this phrase as a litigator would, to refer to the opening up of a subject area by a line
of questioning.
211Cain, supra note 1, at 1592.
212 The alliance seems limited to the first category of activity, proscribed sodomy, which for
Halley's purposes should probably be further divided into oral and anal sodomy because it

seems that such an alliance is likely to coalesce only around practices that a critical mass of
heterosexuals engages in. Survey data on sexual practices may well be unreliable, especially
tending to understate the frequency with which respondents engage in practices they have
reason to believe carry social stigma, but they generally indicate that although the vast
majority of practicing heterosexuals engage in oral sex, only a minority practice anal sex. It
therefore seems the only potentially effective "alliance of sodomites" Halley can hope to put
together is one of practioners of oral sex.
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same way regardless of the sex of the person whose mouth is involved;
so do mouths and clitorises, vulva or vaginas. There seems nothing
gender-specific about a mouth. Although the drafters of the original
sodomy laws-which generally criminalized acts irrespective of the
gender of the participants-may well have believed in an identity of
acts, this view is far from prevalent today. The sex of a person into
whose mouth a penis is inserted makes all the difference, not only in
the laws of several states, but, from all indications, in the minds of the
inhabitants.213 Consider the hostile reaction to much milder displays
of same-sex affection-for example, kissing and hand holdingneither of which differs physically depending on the sexes of the participants. There can be little question that in much of our society
such public displays of affection are tolerated if performed by heterosexual couples but remain taboo for those of the same sex.
Perhaps the broadest definition of proscribed homosexual activity
is, not surprisingly, that set forth in Army regulations governing
discharge for homosexuality. According to the Army, "A homosexual act means bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between soldiers of the same sex for sexual satisfaction."2 4
As Judge William A. Norris points out in his Watkins2" 5 concurrence:
[T]he regulations ...cover any form of bodily contact between per-

sons of the same sex that gives sexual satisfaction-from oral and anal
intercourse to holding hands, kissing, caressing and any number of
213

Given this hostility, it is unclear of what strategic benefit an alliance of sodomites would

be to practioners of heterosexual sodomy. As a matter of principle they may agree that all
sodomites should be treated equally; as a matter of strategy, however, it seems clear that they
are more likely to succeed with their own decriminalizing agenda when not saddled with the

baggage of same-sex sodomy. See infra text accompanying note 218 for a discussion of
legislation in Texas.
214 Army Reg. 635-200, ch.15-3 (1990). In 1989, at the time Watkins v. United States
Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990) was decided,
the Army regulations further provided that any soldier who "engages in, desires to engage in,
or intends to engage in" such an act is defined as "a homosexual" and anyone who "has stated

he or she is a homosexual" shall be separated from the service, as shall anyone who "has
engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act" who
cannot demonstrate that such behavior is aberrational. Army Reg. 635-200 ch. 15-2 to 15-3
(1981).
Much has been made of the aspects of these regulations that penalize homosexual status

rather than homosexual conduct. For present purposes, however, I am chiefly interested in
how the Army has chosen to define the homosexual conduct it is prepared to penalize.
215

875 F.2d 699.
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other sexual acts. Indeed, in this case the Army tried to prove at
Watkins' discharge proceedings that he had committed a homosexual
act described as squeezing the knee of a male soldier, but216failed to
prove it was Watkins who did the alleged knee-squeezing.
If statutes prohibiting simply "the abominable and detestable crime
against nature" withstood a vagueness challenge, what hope would
there be for striking down on such grounds a criminal law patterned
on the Army's regulations?
The history of state sodomy regulation provides little hope to Halley or Cain. Consider, for example, the recent history of the Texas
217
sodomy law, as set forth by the district court in Baker v. Wade.
The statute originally prohibited both homo- and heterosexual acts; it
was then amended to prohibit only homosexual acts and then further
amended to prohibit an even broader variety of homosexual acts.21 8
Two things are significant about the pattern of the Texas legislation.
First, it appears that the legislature is prepared to broaden the statutory prohibition as it becomes aware of sexual practices not previously
covered. Hence, the failure to criminalize certain acts may indicate
not legislative tolerance for these acts but rather the absence of legislative imagination. This would, it seems, further, limit the usefulness
of Cain's proposal.
Second, and most damningly for Halley's proposed "alliance of
sodomites," liberalization of laws concerning heterosexual sodomy
not only does not correspond to a more liberal attitude toward homosexual sodomy, it may not even be the first step in that direction. For
it was in 1981, seven years after heterosexual sodomy was legalized,
219
that the legislature expanded the definition of homosexual sodomy.
216 Id. at 714-15 (Norris, J., concurring).
217 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D.Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,

478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
218 See generally id. at 1148-53 (giving a history of the evolution of the Texas sodomy
statute). By a 1974 amendment, "Article 524 (Sodomy) was replaced with § 21.06
(Homosexual Conduct), which condemned only oral or anal sex between consenting adults of
the same sex." Id. at 1150. The scanty legislative history indicates that a subcommittee "did

seriously consider the decriminalization of the private homosexual acts of consenting adults,
but . . . fearfed] a backlash effect against the entire Penal Code should such acts be
decriminalized." Id. at 1151.
219 Those who see gay identity as determined by the breaking of heterosexual law rather
than same sex desire, see Calhoun, supra note 83, actually see some advantages in this further
criminalization of the homosexual "other." Of course, such persons must generally find
themselves in some tension with advocates for gay and lesbian civil rights, because, in a sense,
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From the perspective of gay rights litigators, this pattern may have
a happy ending, however. The legislative move sharply to divide heterosexual and homosexual sex, fully accepting the former while further criminalizing the latter, may have been the direct cause of the
demise of the Texas sodomy law. In a recent decision currently on
appeal in the Supreme Court of Texas, an intermediate appellate court
struck down the law on state constitutional grounds.220 Its analysis is
an intriguing combination of substantive due process and equal protection; while it strikes the law down on privacy grounds alone,221 the
court is clearly influenced by the discriminatory treatment given
homosexual sex acts.222 It concludes:
If consenting adults have a privacy right to engage in sexual behavior,
then it cannot be constitutional, absent a compelling state objective,
to prohibit lesbians and gay men from engaging in the same conduct
in which heterosexuals may legally engage. In short, the State cannot
make the same conduct criminal when done by one, and innocent
when done by the other.223

In striking down its state's sodomy law a year ago, the Kentucky
Supreme Court made its reliance on state equal protection as well as
privacy guarantees more explicit. Consistent with my analysis of the
privacy decisions, it faulted the statute, inter alia, for failing to take
into account that the act was "private and involves a caring relationship, rather than a commercial one."'224 The court held:
Certainly, the practice of deviate sexual intercourse violates traditional morality. But so does the same act between heterosexuals,
which activity is decriminalized .... The issue here is not whether
a successful campaign for legal and social acceptance of gays and lesbians, an end to their
outsider/lawbreaker status, would mean, for models such as Calhoun's, an apocalyptic end to
gay identity.
220

State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (involving a declaratory

judgment challenge brought by three lesbians and two gay men).
221 "[W]e can think of nothing more fundamentally private and deserving of protection than
sexual behavior between consenting adults in private." Id. at 204.
222 The Texas House responded by introducing legislation recriminalizing both heterosexual
and homosexual acts and the Senate sought to repeal the homosexual sodomy provisions, but,
in the end, the legislature opted to maintain the status quo. Ross Ramsey, Committee
Compromises on State Sodomy Law, Hous. Chron., May 25, 1993, at Al.
223 Morales, 826 S.W.2d at 204. The court notes that one of the compelling interests the
state might have advanced, prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, would apply just as
well to heterosexual sex acts. Id. at 205.
224 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Ky. 1992).
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sexual activity traditionally viewed as immoral can be punished by
society, but whether it can be punished solely on the basis of sexual
preference. .

.

. The question is whether a society that no longer

criminalizes adultery, fornication or deviate sexual intercourse
between heterosexuals, has a rational basis to single out homosexuals
for different treatment ....

If there is a rational basis for different

treatment, it has yet to be demonstrated in this case. We need not
sympathize, agree with, or even understand the sexual preferences of
homosexuals in order to recognize their right to equal treatment
before the bar of criminal justice.2 2

Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, one successful strategy against
the sodomy laws may not be an alliance of sodomites in the political
arena, but something close to its opposite-a disaggregation of samesex and heterosexual acts in the legislative mind followed by a court
challenge to this discriminatory treatment. It is judges, rather than
the mass of heterosexual sodomites, 226 who may be most effectively
convinced that the gender of the participants should not affect the
legal treatment of sex acts.227
CONCLUSION

Having begun by noting the comparative absence of the gay couple
from public sphere litigation about the rights of gays and lesbians, I
might be expected to end by recommending a greater presence for it
in these sorts of cases. For several reasons, I will not do this. First,
couples and coupling should not, in my view, be deemed relevant to
many public sphere questions-the strongest case most gay public
employees can make, for example, is simply that their coupling has
nothing to do with their job performance. Second, as I have discussed
extensively above, coupling presents a double bind for gay and lesbian
225

Id. at 499-501.

As Halley points out, however, where legislative repeal has occurred recently, it has been
of gender-neutral sodomy laws. See Halley, supra note 143, at 1775.
227 Consistent with the notion that same-sex pair bonding is viewed as more threatening
than same-sex copulation, the courts' willingness to find a legal equivalence between
heterosexual and homosexual activity has been far stronger with respect to gay sex than gay
marriage. Equal protection challenges to marriage statutes have generally fared less well than
those to sodomy statutes. Whether this trend will continue depends on the outcome of the
Morales sodomy appeal and the Hawaii marriage remand. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993) (remanding for determination if compelling state interest supports ban on samesex marriage).
226
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litigants. Because couples tend to be sexualized and because consideration of sex, as I have argued, troubles courts, it may only be in sodomy cases, where sex is necessarily already an issue, that a greater
focus on pair-bonding clearly has benefits that outweigh the risks.
Most importantly, the recommendation of a litigation strategy in particular cases or in the broad spectrum of gay rights litigation is way
beyond the scope of this paper. My objective was instead simply to
see what insights might result if one approached the public sphere
litigation history using the rubric of the couple.
One of these insights may be a new appreciation of the military
regulations on homosexuality, which may help explain their continued vigor. These much criticized regulations may have this much to
be said for them-more explicitly and completely than any other statute, policy, or judicial opinion, they spell out exactly what it is that
gays and lesbians do that has most troubled society and the legal system. The military identifies as troubling all recurring forms of same228
sex sexual gratification, public statements of homosexual identity
and attempts to claim the privilege of marriage. An examination of
history shows that, in legal opposition to gay and lesbian rights generally, just as in the military regulations, what are traditionally the
highest and lowest forms of coupling-discrete acts of copulation and
marriage-are singled out for sanction.
As our society struggles with the treatment it is prepared to accord
gay men and lesbians, it must come to terms with precisely those elements of homosexual behavior identified by the military regulations,
in particular with the gay couple in all its forms.

228

See Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1695 (1993).
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